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Security audit

Find Skills — Search Every Skill Registry at Once

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly does what it claims, but its unpinned skill-install path and under-disclosed persistent temp report make it something users should review before installing.

Install only if you are comfortable with a tool that queries public registries, reads the names of locally installed skills, and may help install other skills globally. Prefer a version-pinned Skills CLI, review any recommended third-party skill before installing it, and treat the `/tmp/find-skills-*.json` report as persistent local output that may need cleanup.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/find.sh:206
Finding

Predictable Persistent Temporary Report Permits Symlink-Based File Overwrite

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: scripts/find.sh:206
Vulnerability Type: Predictable temporary file and unsafe destination handling
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

bash
RESULT_FILE="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/find-skills-$(date +%s).json"; cp "$OUT" "$RESULT_FILE"

Technical Analysis

The script copies its result to a filename constructed from the current Unix timestamp. Timestamp resolution is one second, making the destination predictable. Unlike files stored in the protected directory created with mktemp -d, this report is written directly into ${TMPDIR:-/tmp} and is not removed by the existing exit trap.

The cp operation does not atomically reserve a new file and does not verify that the destination is a regular file. If an attacker can create the predicted destination as a symbolic link before the copy occurs, cp may follow that link and overwrite its target with the report contents.

Exploitability depends on local filesystem protections, permissions, and timing. Protections such as Linux fs.protected_symlinks may prevent attacks between different users in a sticky shared directory, but the script should not rely on optional operating-system hardening. An attacker controlling TMPDIR can also direct the persistent report to an untrusted location.

The report contains the user's search query, source health data, locally matched installed-skill names, and public registry metadata. Its persistence also contradicts the documentation stating that temporary files are discarded on exit.

Attack Path

  1. A local attacker determines that the victim is about to execute the Skill.
  2. The attacker predicts the destination name from the current timestamp, such as /tmp/find-skills-1750000000.json.
  3. Before line 206 executes, the attacker creates that pathname as a symbolic link to a file writable by the victim:
    bash
    ln -s /path/to/victim-writable-file /tmp/find-skills-175000000
    

...[truncated 983 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Keep the report inside the already protected $TMP directory unless persistent output is explicitly requested.
  • If a persistent report is required, create it atomically with mktemp rather than constructing its name from a timestamp:
    bash
    umask 077
    RESULT_FILE=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/find-skills.XXXXXXXX.json") || exit 1
    cp -- "$OUT" "$RESULT_FILE"
    
  • Apply umask 077 before creating temporary artifacts so report files are readable and writable only by the invoking user.
  • Reject an untrusted or unsafe TMPDIR, or use a private runtime directory owned by the current user.
  • Remove the persistent report during the exit trap unless the user explicitly requests retention.
  • If writing to a caller-selected destination, use no-follow and exclusive-creation semantics, validate that the destination is not a symbolic link, and avoid overwriting existing files.
  • Update the documentation to accurately describe any report that intentionally persists after execution.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (18)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
allowed-tools: Bash(bash scripts/find.sh*), Bash(scripts/find.sh*), Bash(curl *), Bash(jq *), Bash(gh *), Bash(unzip *), Bash(npx -y skills *), Bash(npx skills

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 54)May include surrounding context.

md
allowed-tools: Bash(bash scripts/find.sh*), Bash(scripts/find.sh*), Bash(curl *), Bash(jq *), Bash(gh *), Bash(unzip *), Bash(npx -y skills *), Bash(npx skills

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

md
allowed-tools: Bash(bash scripts/find.sh*), Bash(scripts/find.sh*), Bash(curl *), Bash(jq *), Bash(gh *), Bash(unzip *), Bash(npx -y skills *), Bash(npx skills

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

md
allowed-tools: Bash(bash scripts/find.sh*), Bash(scripts/find.sh*), Bash(curl *), Bash(jq *), Bash(gh *), Bash(unzip *), Bash(npx -y skills *), Bash(npx skills

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

md
allowed-tools: Bash(bash scripts/find.sh*), Bash(scripts/find.sh*), Bash(curl *), Bash(jq *), Bash(gh *), Bash(unzip *), Bash(npx -y skills *), Bash(npx skills

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

md
allowed-tools: Bash(bash scripts/find.sh*), Bash(scripts/find.sh*), Bash(curl *), Bash(jq *), Bash(gh *), Bash(unzip *), Bash(npx -y skills *), Bash(npx skills

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 163)May include surrounding context.

md
missions. Treat any discovered skill as untrusted third-party code: review its `SKILL.md` and any bundled scripts before running it, and be wary of low-install

Lp1

High
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

The skill uses 'shell' capability that is not listed in its permissions. This may indicate deceptive intent or missing permission declarations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

An unpinned npm-based tool reference in the manifest creates a direct supply-chain risk path under the agent's permitted commands. Since this skill evaluates and helps install other skills, any compromise in the helper CLI could subvert recommendations, downloads, or installation steps.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

An unpinned npm-based tool reference in the manifest creates a direct supply-chain risk path under the agent's permitted commands. Since this skill evaluates and helps install other skills, any compromise in the helper CLI could subvert recommendations, downloads, or installation steps.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger guidance is broad enough to activate on common requests like 'how do I do X', causing the skill to engage in many ordinary conversations. Because this skill performs network lookups and recommends third-party installations, over-broad invocation increases the chance of unnecessary external queries and social-engineering-style nudges toward untrusted code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Allowing npx skills without version pinning makes runtime behavior dependent on the latest published npm package instead of a reviewed artifact. In a skill whose purpose is discovering and helping install third-party code, that increases exposure to supply-chain compromise and unexpected code execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Allowing npx skills without version pinning makes runtime behavior dependent on the latest published npm package instead of a reviewed artifact. In a skill whose purpose is discovering and helping install third-party code, that increases exposure to supply-chain compromise and unexpected code execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The repeated 'when to use' language lacks clear boundaries, so an orchestrator may invoke this skill for ambiguous requests that do not actually require third-party skill discovery. In context, that is risky because this skill is explicitly designed to search registries and steer users toward installation of external code, magnifying exposure when invoked unnecessarily.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unrestricted Tool Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill grants unrestricted tool access without appropriate constraints. An agent with unfettered tool access can perform arbitrary actions including file modification, network requests, and code execution.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 136)May include surrounding context.

md
| --- | --- | --- |
| `curl-pipe-install` | ⛔ risky | pipes a remote script straight into `sh`/`bash` — the #1 audit-failing pattern |
| `eval-remote` / `base64-pipe-exec` | ⛔ risky | executes fetched or obfuscated code at runtime |
| `broad-tool-grant` | ⚠ caution | `allowed-tools` grants `Bash(*)` or unrestricted tool access |
| `reads-secrets` | ⚠ caution | references `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `.env`, private keys |
| `solicits-credentials` | ⚠ caution | asks the user to paste an API key / token / password |

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The installation guidance tells users to run npx -y skills add ... without pinning the CLI version. This can cause users to execute unreviewed package code from the registry at install time, which is a classic supply-chain execution path.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Recommending npx skills init <name> without version pinning again relies on the latest npm package at runtime. While this is a lower-risk scaffolding path than installing arbitrary remote skills, it still executes code from an unpinned upstream package.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The script writes a persistent JSON file to a predictable /tmp-derived path containing the user's query, cross-registry results, and inferred locally installed skill names. On multi-user systems or systems with weak temporary-directory isolation, this can expose behavioral and environment metadata to other local users or processes, and the script does not clearly warn or ask consent before persisting it.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.