T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
setup.md:66- Finding
Unpinned Sideloaded APK Receives Privileged Accessibility Access
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is purpose-built for Android automation, but it asks users to trust a remote service and sideloaded accessibility app while under-disclosing device, screen, and credential exposure.
Install only if you are comfortable giving Mobilerun-mediated agent control over an Android device. Prefer a test phone or non-sensitive cloud device, avoid banking/password/MFA/confidential screens, do not paste API keys into chat, verify the APK source before sideloading, and revoke Accessibility permission or uninstall the Portal app when finished.
setup.md:66Unpinned Sideloaded APK Receives Privileged Accessibility Access
setup.md:75Misleading Disclosure of Accessibility Scope and Remote Data Flow
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /devices/{deviceId}
Content-Type: application/json
{}
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /devices/{deviceId}/keyboard
Clears the currently focused input field.
The uninstall-app endpoint enables a destructive operation against the user's device with only a package name as input. In an agent-controlled environment, insufficient guardrails around such a parameter can lead to accidental or malicious removal of important apps, including security, communications, or business-critical applications.
DELETE /devices/{deviceId}/apps/{packageName}
Content-Type: application/json
{}
The skill description presents very broad capabilities like automating any Android app, social media, testing, data collection, or anything done manually, without meaningful trigger constraints or usage boundaries. In a device-control skill, this can cause over-invocation or use in sensitive contexts, increasing the chance of privacy-invasive, account-impacting, or unintended actions on a real phone.
The skill claims the API key is securely handled via an environment variable and that no data leaves the user's control, yet it also instructs the agent to ask the user to provide the API key directly if the variable is unavailable. Prompting for secrets in chat increases the risk of credential exposure in conversation logs, prompt history, or downstream tooling, undermining the stated security model.
The documentation describes direct control over a real Android device, including tapping, typing, app management, screenshots, and UI inspection, but does not prominently warn users about privacy exposure or account-impacting actions. Because this can operate on a personal phone and real apps, the missing warning materially increases the risk of unintended purchases, message sending, account changes, or collection of sensitive on-screen data.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
## Before You Start
Do NOT ask the user for an API key or to set up a device before checking. Always probe first:
1. **Resolve the API key:**
- The key is provided via the `MOBILERUN_API_KEY` environment variable (set by OpenClaw during skill loading)
The task API explicitly allows callers to submit credentials and files to an autonomous agent, but the documentation does not clearly warn that this data may be transmitted to Mobilerun infrastructure and then used during remote task execution. In a skill whose purpose is to automate a real Android device, that omission materially increases the risk of users exposing secrets or sensitive files without informed consent.
Webhook setup sends task lifecycle data to a user-specified external target URL, but the documentation does not warn that task-related metadata will leave the Mobilerun environment and be delivered to another system. Because this skill deals with device automation and potentially sensitive task context, the omission can lead to unintentional disclosure to third-party endpoints.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Phone Control API Reference
Base URL: `https://api.mobilerun.ai/v1`
Auth: Use the `MOBILERUN_API_KEY` environment variable in the Authorization header.
This document covers how to control an Android device connected to Mobilerun.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Phone Control API Reference
Base URL: `https://api.mobilerun.ai/v1`
Auth: Use the `MOBILERUN_API_KEY` environment variable in the Authorization header.
This document covers how to control an Android device connected to Mobilerun.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Phone Control API Reference
Base URL: `https://api.mobilerun.ai/v1`
Auth: Use the `MOBILERUN_API_KEY` environment variable in the Authorization header.
This document covers how to control an Android device connected to Mobilerun.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Phone Control API Reference
Base URL: `https://api.mobilerun.ai/v1`
Auth: Use the `MOBILERUN_API_KEY` environment variable in the Authorization header.
This document covers how to control an Android device connected to Mobilerun.
The documented screenshot and UI-state endpoints expose highly sensitive on-device data, including full screen contents, accessibility text, focused elements, and app context. In an agentic setting, this can reveal messages, passwords, MFA prompts, personal data, or other confidential content; the lack of an explicit privacy warning or consent boundary increases the risk of misuse or overcollection.
The uninstall endpoint performs a destructive action on the user's device, yet the documentation does not clearly warn that it removes installed applications and may delete user access or related local app data. In an autonomous agent context, omission of that warning makes accidental destructive actions more likely.
L018 states the API key should be stored securely and never hardcoded or exposed, but L081 later says the agent should provide that same key to the user during device connection. Even if the intended meaning is user-mediated entry into their own device, the wording contradicts the earlier secrecy guidance and could normalize key disclosure.
The documentation materially understates the power of Android accessibility access by claiming it does not grant access to other apps' data, while the same section says it can read on-screen element names and positions across apps. This can mislead users into granting a highly privileged permission without informed consent, increasing privacy and abuse risk.
The setup directs use of an API key in the mobile app without an explicit warning that the key is a bearer credential that grants account/device access. Users may paste a long-lived secret into a device or app context without understanding the exposure, especially on a personal phone that may be compromised, shared, or logged.
Telling the agent to provide the user's API key back during setup creates a secret re-disclosure path, which can expose the credential in agent output, logs, transcripts, or prompt history. Even if the key originated from the user, repeating it violates least exposure and increases the chance of accidental leakage.
The documentation makes a concrete billing/access claim that free users can control personal devices with no subscription, but immediately notes that free-plan details are still not finalized. This inconsistency can mislead users and downstream agents into taking actions based on unsupported entitlement assumptions, causing failed workflows, support churn, or accidental exposure of capabilities before policy and controls are finalized.
The document instructs users to place an API key in an Authorization header via an environment variable but provides no warning about secret handling, logging, or accidental disclosure. In agent/tooling ecosystems, such credentials are often exposed through debug logs, prompts, error messages, or misconfigured environments, which could allow unauthorized control of connected devices.