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Security audit

Mobilerun

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is purpose-built for Android automation, but it asks users to trust a remote service and sideloaded accessibility app while under-disclosing device, screen, and credential exposure.

Install only if you are comfortable giving Mobilerun-mediated agent control over an Android device. Prefer a test phone or non-sensitive cloud device, avoid banking/password/MFA/confidential screens, do not paste API keys into chat, verify the APK source before sideloading, and revoke Accessibility permission or uninstall the Portal app when finished.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
setup.md:66
Finding

Unpinned Sideloaded APK Receives Privileged Accessibility Access

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
setup.md:75
Finding

Misleading Disclosure of Accessibility Scope and Remote Data Flow

Content
View full analysis
Give your OpenClaw agent hands on a real Android phone. Tap, swipe, type, take screenshots, read the UI accessibility tree, and manage apps — all through the official Mobilerun API (mobilerun.ai). Your agent can automate any Android app: social media, testing, data collection, or anything you'd do manually. Uses YOUR API key (stored securely via MOBILERUN_API_KEY env var) and YOUR device (personal phone via Portal APK or cloud device). No data leaves your control. ``` The documented API can retrieve screenshots and accessibility-tree fields such as: ```json { "focusedElement": { "className": "string", "resourceId": "string", "text": "string" } } ``` Accessibility nodes can also contain `text`, `contentDescription`, application package names, resource identifiers, element bounds, and interaction states. ### Technical Analysis The statement that Accessibility permission “does not grant access to other apps' data” is materially incomplete in the context of the documented functionality. The skill explicitly uses Accessibility to read on-screen text and element metadata and claims it can automate any Android application. Although this does ...[truncated 2252 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (21)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · api.md (reported line 99)May include surrounding context.

Terminate a Cloud Device

text
DELETE /devices/{deviceId}
Content-Type: application/json

{}

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · phone-api.md (reported line 278)May include surrounding context.

Clear Input

text
DELETE /devices/{deviceId}/keyboard

Clears the currently focused input field.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The uninstall-app endpoint enables a destructive operation against the user's device with only a package name as input. In an agent-controlled environment, insufficient guardrails around such a parameter can lead to accidental or malicious removal of important apps, including security, communications, or business-critical applications.

Content

Scanner excerpt · phone-api.md (reported line 356)May include surrounding context.

Uninstall App

text
DELETE /devices/{deviceId}/apps/{packageName}
Content-Type: application/json

{}

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill description presents very broad capabilities like automating any Android app, social media, testing, data collection, or anything done manually, without meaningful trigger constraints or usage boundaries. In a device-control skill, this can cause over-invocation or use in sensitive contexts, increasing the chance of privacy-invasive, account-impacting, or unintended actions on a real phone.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill claims the API key is securely handled via an environment variable and that no data leaves the user's control, yet it also instructs the agent to ask the user to provide the API key directly if the variable is unavailable. Prompting for secrets in chat increases the risk of credential exposure in conversation logs, prompt history, or downstream tooling, undermining the stated security model.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The documentation describes direct control over a real Android device, including tapping, typing, app management, screenshots, and UI inspection, but does not prominently warn users about privacy exposure or account-impacting actions. Because this can operate on a personal phone and real apps, the missing warning materially increases the risk of unintended purchases, message sending, account changes, or collection of sensitive on-screen data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

md
## Before You Start

Do NOT ask the user for an API key or to set up a device before checking. Always probe first:

1. **Resolve the API key:**
   - The key is provided via the `MOBILERUN_API_KEY` environment variable (set by OpenClaw during skill loading)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The task API explicitly allows callers to submit credentials and files to an autonomous agent, but the documentation does not clearly warn that this data may be transmitted to Mobilerun infrastructure and then used during remote task execution. In a skill whose purpose is to automate a real Android device, that omission materially increases the risk of users exposing secrets or sensitive files without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Webhook setup sends task lifecycle data to a user-specified external target URL, but the documentation does not warn that task-related metadata will leave the Mobilerun environment and be delivered to another system. Because this skill deals with device automation and potentially sensitive task context, the omission can lead to unintentional disclosure to third-party endpoints.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

md
# Phone Control API Reference

Base URL: `https://api.mobilerun.ai/v1`
Auth: Use the `MOBILERUN_API_KEY` environment variable in the Authorization header.

This document covers how to control an Android device connected to Mobilerun.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · api.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
# Phone Control API Reference

Base URL: `https://api.mobilerun.ai/v1`
Auth: Use the `MOBILERUN_API_KEY` environment variable in the Authorization header.

This document covers how to control an Android device connected to Mobilerun.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · phone-api.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
# Phone Control API Reference

Base URL: `https://api.mobilerun.ai/v1`
Auth: Use the `MOBILERUN_API_KEY` environment variable in the Authorization header.

This document covers how to control an Android device connected to Mobilerun.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · setup.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md
# Phone Control API Reference

Base URL: `https://api.mobilerun.ai/v1`
Auth: Use the `MOBILERUN_API_KEY` environment variable in the Authorization header.

This document covers how to control an Android device connected to Mobilerun.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The documented screenshot and UI-state endpoints expose highly sensitive on-device data, including full screen contents, accessibility text, focused elements, and app context. In an agentic setting, this can reveal messages, passwords, MFA prompts, personal data, or other confidential content; the lack of an explicit privacy warning or consent boundary increases the risk of misuse or overcollection.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The uninstall endpoint performs a destructive action on the user's device, yet the documentation does not clearly warn that it removes installed applications and may delete user access or related local app data. In an autonomous agent context, omission of that warning makes accidental destructive actions more likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

L018 states the API key should be stored securely and never hardcoded or exposed, but L081 later says the agent should provide that same key to the user during device connection. Even if the intended meaning is user-mediated entry into their own device, the wording contradicts the earlier secrecy guidance and could normalize key disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The documentation materially understates the power of Android accessibility access by claiming it does not grant access to other apps' data, while the same section says it can read on-screen element names and positions across apps. This can mislead users into granting a highly privileged permission without informed consent, increasing privacy and abuse risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The setup directs use of an API key in the mobile app without an explicit warning that the key is a bearer credential that grants account/device access. Users may paste a long-lived secret into a device or app context without understanding the exposure, especially on a personal phone that may be compromised, shared, or logged.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Telling the agent to provide the user's API key back during setup creates a secret re-disclosure path, which can expose the credential in agent output, logs, transcripts, or prompt history. Even if the key originated from the user, repeating it violates least exposure and increases the chance of accidental leakage.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documentation makes a concrete billing/access claim that free users can control personal devices with no subscription, but immediately notes that free-plan details are still not finalized. This inconsistency can mislead users and downstream agents into taking actions based on unsupported entitlement assumptions, causing failed workflows, support churn, or accidental exposure of capabilities before policy and controls are finalized.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The document instructs users to place an API key in an Authorization header via an environment variable but provides no warning about secret handling, logging, or accidental disclosure. In agent/tooling ecosystems, such credentials are often exposed through debug logs, prompts, error messages, or misconfigured environments, which could allow unauthorized control of connected devices.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.