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Security audit

Win11 Visible Browser

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent, but it needs review because it can expose control of a visible logged-in browser through a powerful CDP relay and one helper prints full page URLs.

Install only if you specifically need OpenClaw to control a visible Windows browser from WSL. Prefer a dedicated browser profile, review the PowerShell script before use, require confirmation before firewall/portproxy/profile changes, verify the relay is not reachable from LAN or Internet, and avoid running the budget helper on sensitive tabs unless full URLs are redacted or acceptable to disclose.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/start-win11-browser-cdp-for-openclaw.ps1:117
Finding

Unauthenticated CDP Relay Binds to All Windows Network Interfaces

Content
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127.0.0.1:$CdpPort" netsh interface portproxy delete v4tov4 listenaddress=0.0.0.0 listenport=$RelayPort 2>$null | Out-Null netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenaddress=0.0.0.0 listenport=$RelayPort connectaddress=127.0.0.1 connectport=$CdpPort | Out-Null if (!(Test-HttpOk "http://127.0.0.1:$RelayPort/json/version")) { throw "Local portproxy test failed on 127.0.0.1:$RelayPort" } Write-Log "Portproxy responding locally on 127.0.0.1:$RelayPort" } function Ensure-Firewall([string]$RemoteCidr) { if (-not $RemoteCidr -or $RemoteCidr -eq '0.0.0.0/0') { throw 'Refusing to create broad firewall rule for browser CDP relay.' } Write-Log "Ensuring firewall rule '$FirewallRuleName' for remote $RemoteCidr -> TCP $RelayPort" Get-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName $OldFirewallRuleName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ...[truncated 3183 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/browser-budget-check.sh:70
Finding

Browser Budget Helper Prints Sensitive Page Titles and Complete URLs

Content
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t.type==='page')) { console.log(`- ${(t.title || '(untitled)').replace(/\s+/g,' ').slice(0,80)} — ${t.url}`); } ``` ### Technical Analysis The helper queries CDP's `/json/list` endpoint and prints every page target's title and complete URL to standard output. Browser URLs can contain sensitive query parameters and fragments, including search terms, internal document identifiers, invitation tokens, password-reset tokens, OAuth authorization codes, and other bearer values. Although page titles are truncated, URLs are not sanitized or truncated. Standard output may be retained in Agent transcripts, terminal logs, support records, CI output, or other diagnostic artifacts. The declared resource-budget function only requires target counts, target types, domain aggregation, and pressure indicators; complete URLs are not necessary for that purpose. This finding explains the static pre-scan's sensitive network-data pattern: the helper reads browser-session metadata from a local network CDP endpoint. No evidence shows that the project sends this information to an external collection server, but emitting it unredacted creates a secondary disclosure channel. ### Attack Path 1. A user opens a page whose URL contains private information or a bearer token. 2. The browser exposes that target through the local CDP `/json/list` endpoint. 3. The user or Agent runs `scripts/browser-budget-check.sh`. 4. The helper prints the complete sensitive URL and page title to standard output. 5. The output is stored in an Agent conversation, shell capture, diagnostic log, CI record, or support report. 6. A party with access to that retained output learns the browsing information or reuses a still-valid URL token. ### ...[truncated 573 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (3)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs use of shell commands and references scripts that can modify firewall rules, portproxy settings, browser processes, Scheduled Tasks, and configuration, but it does not declare any tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. That omission weakens least-privilege controls and increases the chance an agent can invoke broader shell capabilities than intended, especially in a skill that bridges into a real user browser session with existing cookies and logins.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The skill's stated purpose includes safe, human-in-the-loop visible browser control with strong tab-hygiene constraints, and earlier sections explicitly say to default to one or two tabs and 'do not open a fan-out of many result cards/resumes/products.' Line L241 promotes 'multi-tab orchestration' by opening several search results at once, which is not clearly justified given the skill's own resource-minimizing and minimal-tab workflow guidance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Earlier documentation says 'Default to one list/search tab and, if needed, one reusable detail tab' and 'Do not open a fan-out of many result cards/resumes/products' (L120-L123). L241 directly recommends opening several search results at once for comparison, which is an active contradiction in the skill's own documented intent and operating model.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.