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Security audit

飞书@机器人

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Feishu bot skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but it tells users to handle app secrets, bearer tokens, chat history, and message sending through broad raw API examples without enough safety scoping.

Install only if you are comfortable with a skill that helps send Feishu group messages and inspect recent group message history for mentions. Use it only with approved chats, least-privilege Feishu app permissions, secure secret storage, and redacted logs; avoid putting real app_secret values or bearer tokens directly into shell commands.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:36
Finding

Credentials Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs operators to obtain a tenant access token using app credentials and query group message history to extract mentions, but it provides no warning about the sensitivity of chat data, tokens, or access control requirements. This can lead users or downstream agents to access private conversation history and handle secrets insecurely, increasing the chance of privacy violations or credential exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 1. 获取 tenant_access_token
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/auth/v3/tenant_access_token/internal" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"app_id":"YOUR_APP_ID","app_secret":"YOUR_APP_SECRET"}' | jq -r '.tenant_access_token')

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

使用飞书 API 直接调用

bash
curl -X POST "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/im/v1/messages?receive_id_type=chat_id" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.