T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- README.md:7
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `README.md:7-8` and `SKILL.md:140` **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependency and mutable supply-chain resolution **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code `README.md:7-8`: ```bash cd /mnt/storage/ada_projects/google-free-media-skill npm install puppeteer ``` `SKILL.md:140`: ```text 1. Install Puppeteer: npm install puppeteer ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions retrieve the latest version of Puppeteer without specifying an exact version. The project also does not include a reviewed `package.json` or committed lockfile that would constrain the package and its transitive dependencies to known versions and integrity hashes. Consequently, the effective dependency graph can change after the Skill has been audited. An unexpected, compromised, or malicious future package release could execute package lifecycle scripts or introduce unsafe runtime behavior with the privileges of the user performing the installation. This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current Puppeteer package is malicious. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the documented setup instructions. 2. `npm install puppeteer` queries the configured npm registry for the currently resolved release. 3. npm resolves a mutable package version and transitive dependency graph not reviewed as part of this project. 4. If the package, a transitive dependency, the registry configuration, or the relevant publisher account has been compromised, npm installs the attacker-controlled release. 5. Any permitted lifecycle script executes with the installing user's privileges, or malicious dependency code executes when subsequently imported. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary code under the account running npm or the Skill. This may permit access to files, environment variables, browser profiles, Google session material, and other resources available to that account. The ...[truncated 189 chars]
- Remediation
- <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Add a reviewed `package.json` that pins Puppeteer to an exact version rather than a range. 2. Generate and commit a lockfile containing the complete dependency graph and integrity hashes. 3. In deployment documentation, replace ad hoc installation with: ```bash npm ci ``` 4. Review package provenance, publisher history, lifecycle scripts, and transitive dependencies before updating the lockfile. 5. Use a trusted registry and enforce registry configuration so package names cannot resolve through an unintended source. 6. Consider `npm ci --ignore-scripts` where compatible. If lifecycle scripts are required, explicitly review and permit them. 7. Run dependency installation as a dedicated, unprivileged user without access to browser profiles or unrelated secrets. 8. Integrate dependency auditing and controlled update review into the release process. ]]>