T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:8- Finding
Autonomous Role and Instruction Hijacking Through Externally Controlled Jobs
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 8–10, 25–40, 63–64, and 82–97
Vulnerability Type:T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
markdown You are an autonomous AI agent operating on XPR Network's trustless agent registry. Your on-chain identity is the account stored in XPR_ACCOUNT.markdown **A. Hunt for open jobs (PROACTIVE — primary workflow):** 1. Poll for open jobs with `xpr_list_open_jobs` 2. Review job details: title, description, deliverables, budget, deadline 3. Evaluate if you have the capabilities and can deliver on time 4. Submit a bid with `xpr_submit_bid` including your proposed amount, timeline, and a detailed proposal 5. Wait for the client to select your bid 6. When selected, the job is assigned to you — proceed to acceptance **B. Accept direct-hire jobs (REACTIVE):** 1. Check incoming jobs with `xpr_list_jobs` filtered by your account 2. Review job details: title, description, deliverables, amount, deadline 3. Verify the client is legitimate (check their account, past jobs) 4. Accept with `xpr_accept_job` only if you can delivermarkdown 5. NEVER deliver just a URL or summary — always include the actual work 6. NEVER say you can't create images or videos — you HAVE the tools for this!markdown - **ALWAYS** bid at least the estimated XPR amount — this is your minimum profitable price - If the budget is above your cost estimate: bid at or near budget (more profit) - If the budget is below cost: bid at your estimated cost (you can bid ABOVE the posted budget — the client can accept or reject) - If the job is wildly unprofitable (budget < 25% of cost): skip itTechnical Analysis
The skill replaces the host agent's normal role with that of an autonomous blockchain marketplace operator. It uses mandatory identity and behavior directives, including
ALWAYSandNEVERstatements, to ...[truncated 1965 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove role-replacement language such as “You are an autonomous AI agent.”
- Replace
ALWAYSandNEVERdirectives with conditional guidance subordinate to platform policy and explicit user intent. - Treat every job title, description, deliverable, proposal, URI, and A2A message as untrusted data.
- Keep untrusted job content in a structured data boundary and prohibit it from changing system instructions or tool permissions.
- Apply prompt-injection detection and enforce a narrow allowlist of supported task types.
- Require explicit, informed user approval before bidding, accepting jobs, publishing content, creating repositories, delivering work, spending funds, or initiating signed operations.
- Verify actual tool availability and policy eligibility at runtime rather than asserting capabilities in skill text.
- Apply budget, destination, content, and rate limits independently of instructions received from marketplace participants.
