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Security audit

LTX-2.3 Video API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This video-generation skill is mostly coherent, but it exposes a specific API key and gives users risky third-party upload and unpinned plugin-install instructions.

Do not install or use this version as-is. The exposed LTX key should be revoked and removed from all published copies, users should supply their own key through a protected secret mechanism, media uploads should use a user-controlled or official private upload path, and the ComfyUI node should be pinned to a reviewed commit or release before installation.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:193
Finding

Hardcoded LTX API Bearer Token in Distributed Documentation

Content
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`. 4. Requests are charged against or attributed to the credential owner until the token is revoked or expires. 5. If the attacker also has local access, the disclosed `~/clawd/.env` path identifies an additional source from which current or replacement credentials may be collected. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation may permit unauthorized use of the LTX account within the token's se ...[truncated 440 chars]
Remediation
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other

Error
Location
SKILL.md:103
Finding

Sensitive Voice and Portrait Files Uploaded to an Unrelated Public Hosting Service

Content
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Remediation
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T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:183
Finding

Unpinned Remote Code Installed as an Executable ComfyUI Custom Node

Content
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Remediation
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``` 2. Prefer a signed, immutable release artifact and verify its cryptographic signature or published SHA-256 checksum. 3. Record the reviewed version and expected hash in `SKILL.md`. 4. Review initialization code and dependency declarations before allowing ComfyUI to load the node. 5. Disable automatic updates; require a fresh security review before changing the pinned version. 6. Run ComfyUI under a dedicated, non-administrative account or sandbox with restricted filesystem and network access. 7. Do not expose unrelated secrets to the ComfyUI process environment. 8. Maintain an allowlist of approved custom nodes and versions. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (12)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill discloses a specific stored API key and directs its use from a local credential file, which is a direct secret exposure. Anyone with access to the skill content could abuse the key for unauthorized API usage, billing fraud, impersonation, or pivoting into other systems if the environment contains additional secrets.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This markdown contains a live secret and reveals where credentials are stored locally without any masking or warning, materially increasing the chance of credential theft. The exposure is especially dangerous because the skill is documentation meant to be copied, shared, and reused, amplifying secret dissemination.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

md
## API Reference

**Base URL:** `https://api.ltx.video/v1`  
**Auth:** `Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>`  
**Response:** MP4 binary (direct download, no polling)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

md
## API Reference

**Base URL:** `https://api.ltx.video/v1`  
**Auth:** `Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>`  
**Response:** MP4 binary (direct download, no polling)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

md
## API Reference

**Base URL:** `https://api.ltx.video/v1`  
**Auth:** `Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>`  
**Response:** MP4 binary (direct download, no polling)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 82)May include surrounding context.

md
## API Reference

**Base URL:** `https://api.ltx.video/v1`  
**Auth:** `Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>`  
**Response:** MP4 binary (direct download, no polling)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

Text to Video

bash
curl -X POST "https://api.ltx.video/v1/text-to-video" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LTX_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

md
def ltx_audio_to_video(audio_url, image_url, prompt, api_key,
                        model="ltx-2-3-pro", resolution="1920x1080",
                        output_path="output.mp4"):
    r = requests.post(
        "https://api.ltx.video/v1/audio-to-video",
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_key}",
                 "Content-Type": "application/json"},

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

md
def ltx_audio_to_video(audio_url, image_url, prompt, api_key,
                        model="ltx-2-3-pro", resolution="1920x1080",
                        output_path="output.mp4"):
    r = requests.post(
        "https://api.ltx.video/v1/audio-to-video",
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_key}",
                 "Content-Type": "application/json"},

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to upload media to uguu.se, a third-party file host unrelated to the core LTX API, causing user-provided audio/images to be transmitted to an additional external service. This expands data exposure, weakens privacy guarantees, and could leak sensitive media or metadata if users follow the documented workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill expands from API usage into installing third-party ComfyUI nodes from GitHub, which introduces software supply-chain risk outside the stated purpose. Users may execute unreviewed code with local permissions, creating a path to credential theft, malware, or broader workstation compromise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes a video-generation skill using the LTX API, but the documentation instructs users to run ffmpeg locally to resize images. That introduces a separate local media-processing/tooling capability beyond calling the advertised API operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.