T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:16- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Plugin Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 16
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk from an unpinned third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet:
shell openclaw plugins install openclaw-morphixaiTechnical Analysis
The skill directs users to install the third-party
openclaw-morphixaiplugin using only a mutable package name. It does not pin a reviewed version or immutable digest, verify a checksum or signature, or identify a trusted source from which the package must be obtained.Consequently, the code installed when the command is executed may differ from the version originally reviewed. A compromised registry account, malicious package replacement, dependency confusion condition, or unsafe future release could introduce attacker-controlled behavior.
This risk is security-sensitive because the plugin is subsequently entrusted with a MorphixAI API key and access to a linked Microsoft Outlook Calendar account. Its documented capabilities include reading calendar and user information and creating, updating, or deleting events.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the plugin's distribution account or otherwise causes a malicious package or release to resolve under
openclaw-morphixai. - A user follows the skill documentation and executes the unpinned installation command.
- The package manager retrieves and installs the attacker-controlled version because no version, digest, signature, or checksum is enforced.
- The user configures
MORPHIXAI_API_KEYand links an Outlook Calendar account as instructed. - The compromised plugin accesses the API key or abuses the linked account's granted permissions.
- Subject to those permissions, the plugin can expose calendar information or perform unauthorized calendar operations.
This path depends on compromise or substitution of the external dependency; the audited file itself does not contain an embedded ...[truncated 772 chars]
- An attacker compromises the plugin's distribution account or otherwise causes a malicious package or release to resolve under
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the plugin to a specifically reviewed version rather than installing the latest mutable release.
- Prefer an immutable package digest or commit identifier where the plugin system supports it.
- Publish the authoritative package registry and source repository locations to reduce package-substitution and dependency-confusion risks.
- Verify package signatures or cryptographic checksums before installation.
- Document the expected publisher identity and provide a reproducible verification procedure.
- Review the plugin and its transitive dependencies before approving upgrades.
- Document and minimize the OAuth scopes granted to the linked Outlook account.
- Use a narrowly scoped, revocable API key and rotate it if dependency compromise is suspected.
- Require explicit user confirmation before destructive operations or actions that send invitations.
- Monitor plugin releases and maintain a controlled allowlist of approved versions.
