Google Tasks

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 5:18 AM UTC
• Version: 0.1.1

Overview

This is a straightforward Google Tasks skill, with expected account-linking and task mutation features but some install and deletion caution needed.

Install only if you trust the MorphixAI plugin and understand it will use a MorphixAI API key with a linked Google Tasks account. Treat create, update, complete, and delete examples as live changes to your Google Tasks data, and use extra care with delete actions.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:17

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Plugin Installation

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 17
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and unauditable third-party dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Code Snippet:

text

1. **安装插件**: `openclaw plugins install openclaw-morphixai`

Technical Analysis

The documented installation command does not specify an immutable plugin version or integrity checksum. The project also contains no source code, lockfile, package manifest, or reproducible source reference for openclaw-morphixai. Therefore, the exact code installed by this command may change after the Skill has been reviewed.

The plugin is expected to operate in an environment containing MORPHIXAI_API_KEY and to mediate access to a linked Google Tasks account. A compromised publisher account, malicious future release, registry compromise, or dependency substitution could consequently introduce behavior outside the documented Google Tasks integration.

The reviewed file transparently identifies MorphixAI as the intermediary, and no direct evidence of a malicious package, hidden endpoint, credential theft, or unauthorized execution was found. The risk arises from installing mutable third-party code whose implementation is outside the audit scope.

Attack Path

1. A user follows the instruction at SKILL.md:17.
2. The package manager resolves the current release of openclaw-morphixai because no reviewed version or digest is specified.
3. An attacker compromises the package publisher, registry, distribution channel, or a future package release.
4. The affected release is installed and executes with the permissions granted to OpenClaw plugins.
5. The malicious plugin may access the configured MorphixAI credential or abuse the linked Google Tasks operations available through the integration.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could expose the MorphixAI API key and task data available to the linked account. It could also allow unauthorized creation, modification, completio ...[truncated 240 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Pin openclaw-morphixai to a specific, reviewed, immutable version rather than installing the latest available release.
2. Verify the package with a trusted cryptographic digest or signature and document the expected publisher identity.
3. Include a lockfile, package manifest, or reproducible source reference that identifies the exact audited implementation.
4. Review and document the plugin's required permissions, network destinations, credential access, and Google Tasks authorization scopes.
5. Restrict the plugin to the minimum privileges required for Google Tasks operations.
6. Store MORPHIXAI_API_KEY in an approved secret store and prevent unnecessary processes or plugins from reading it.
7. Establish an update-review process so newer plugin releases are audited before deployment.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The skill documents destructive delete_task_list and delete_task operations without warning that they permanently remove remote Google Tasks data. In an agent setting, this increases the chance of accidental or socially engineered data loss because users may not realize the action is irreversible or state-changing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 88% confidence

Finding

The workflow and notes describe update and completion actions without clearly warning that they modify the user's live Google Tasks account. This can lead to unintended state changes if an agent executes examples directly or if users interpret the skill as read-only documentation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.