T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:16- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Plugin Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 16
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk from an unpinned third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet:
text 1. **Install plugin**: `openclaw plugins install openclaw-morphixai`Technical Analysis
The installation instruction identifies the plugin only by package name. It does not pin a reviewed version or immutable digest, require signature or checksum verification, or document a trusted package source. Consequently, the code installed when a user follows this instruction may differ from the version that was originally reviewed.
The plugin implementation is not included in this project, so its executable behavior cannot be verified from the audited artifact. This does not establish that the current plugin is malicious; it creates a supply-chain exposure in which a compromised publisher account, package registry, dependency-resolution mechanism, or later plugin release could distribute altered code.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the plugin publisher, distribution registry, or mutable release channel for
openclaw-morphixai. - The attacker publishes a modified release under the expected package name.
- A user follows the documented unpinned installation command.
- The package manager resolves and installs the attacker-controlled release.
- When loaded or invoked, the modified plugin executes with the permissions available to the OpenClaw process.
- The plugin may access process-visible credentials, including
MORPHIXAI_API_KEY, and misuse the Confluence capabilities granted to the connected account.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide code execution within the security context of the OpenClaw process. The resulting scope depends on local sandboxing, filesystem permissions, environment-variable exposure, and the permissions of the connected Confluence account.
Potentia ...[truncated 359 chars]
- An attacker compromises the plugin publisher, distribution registry, or mutable release channel for
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
openclaw-morphixaito a specifically reviewed version rather than resolving the latest mutable release. - Where supported, pin an immutable artifact digest and verify a publisher signature or cryptographic checksum before installation.
- Document the authoritative registry and publisher identity to reduce dependency-confusion and typosquatting risks.
- Review the plugin source and transitive dependency lockfile before recommending installation.
- Run the plugin in a restricted environment with minimal filesystem, network, and process permissions.
- Grant the connected Confluence account only the spaces and operations required for the intended workflow.
- Keep
MORPHIXAI_API_KEYscoped, short-lived where possible, excluded from logs, and subject to rotation and revocation. - Establish an update-review process so version changes are assessed before deployment rather than installed automatically.
- Pin