T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
package.json:8- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies and Potential On-Demand Package Execution
- Content
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=10.0.0", "iterative-loop": ">=1.0.0" } ``` `SKILL.md:171`: ```text - JS/TS: npx vitest --coverage / npx jest --coverage ``` ### Technical Analysis The `>=` version constraints permit any future release satisfying the specified minimum version to be installed. The project contains no reviewed lockfile or integrity metadata that would constrain dependency resolution to known artifacts. The documented `npx vitest` and `npx jest` commands do not require a project-local, pinned binary. Depending on the npm/npx version and local installation state, `npx` can offer to retrieve and execute a package from the configured registry. Package CLI code and installation lifecycle scripts execute with the privileges of the user or Agent running the command. This creates a supply-chain trust boundary in which newly published, compromised, or incorrectly resolved packages may execute without being represented in the audited project contents. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the publisher account, release process, registry entry, or transitive dependency of one of the declared dependencies or an `npx`-invoked package. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release that satisfies an open-ended `>=` constraint, or causes an unpinned `npx` invocation to resolve to compromised package content. 3. A user or Agent installs the project dependencies or runs the documented coverage command without a reviewed lockfile and local-only execution restriction. 4. The package manager retrieves the attacker-controlled release. 5. Malicious lifecycle scripts or CLI entry-point code execute with the permissions of the invoking user or ...[truncated 609 chars]- Remediation
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