Tainted flow: 'content' from requests.get (line 193, network input) → requests.post (network output)
Medium
- Category
- Data Flow
- Content
content = f"⚠️ n8n工作流异常告警\n共发现{len(executions)}个失败任务:\n" for exec in executions: content += f"- 工作流:{exec['workflow']['name']}\n 错误:{exec['error']['message']}\n" requests.post(args.webhook, json={"msgtype": "text", "text": {"content": content}}) print("✅ 告警已推送到企业微信") except: pass- Confidence
- 89% confidence
- Finding
- The monitor command takes error details returned by the n8n API and forwards them to a user-supplied webhook without validation or redaction. This can leak sensitive workflow names, error messages, stack traces, credentials, URLs, or business data to an external destination, especially because the webhook can point to any host.
