T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:4- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party npm Package Installed with Registrar Credentials
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 4
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml metadata: {"openclaw": {"requires": {"bins": ["node", "npm"], "env": ["NAMECOM_USERNAME", "NAMECOM_TOKEN"], "envOptional": ["NAMECOM_USERNAME_TEST", "NAMECOM_TOKEN_TEST"]}, "primaryEnv": "NAMECOM_TOKEN", "homepage": "https://github.com/patramsey/namecom-clawbot", "install": [{"id": "node", "kind": "node", "package": "namecom-clawbot", "bins": ["namecom-clawbot"], "label": "Install namecom-clawbot MCP server (npm)"}]}}Technical Analysis
The installation metadata identifies
namecom-clawbotonly by its npm package name. It does not pin an exact audited version or specify an integrity hash. Consequently, installation can resolve to a future package release whose contents differ from those reviewed during this audit.The package is intended to execute with access to
NAMECOM_USERNAMEandNAMECOM_TOKEN. According to the skill documentation, the Name.com token does not support per-operation scopes and can perform sensitive registrar and DNS operations. AlthoughSKILL.mdstates that the package uses signed npm provenance, provenance establishes a relationship with a build source; it does not guarantee that every future source change or release is trustworthy. The executable package source was not included in the audited project, so its implementation and the documented purchase-confirmation gate could not be independently verified.This is a supply-chain exposure rather than evidence that the currently published package is malicious.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, release workflow, source repository, or another component used to publish
namecom-clawbot. - The attacker publishes a malicious release under the same npm package name.
- A user or automated host installs the dependency without an exact version and ...[truncated 1463 chars]
- An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, release workflow, source repository, or another component used to publish
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
namecom-clawbotto an exact version that has been reviewed, rather than allowing npm to resolve an unspecified release. - Enforce the expected package integrity digest through a lockfile or equivalent verified installation mechanism.
- Vendor or otherwise retain the reviewed executable source so the deployed implementation can be compared with the audited version.
- Verify npm provenance, release signatures, repository tags, and build workflow identity before installation; do not treat provenance alone as a security review.
- Pin and audit transitive dependencies and use reproducible, immutable builds.
- Run the MCP server as a dedicated, unprivileged operating-system user inside a container or similarly isolated environment.
- Expose only the required Name.com credentials to the process and prevent access to unrelated environment variables, files, and host services.
- Apply Name.com API IP whitelisting and use sandbox credentials during validation.
- Prefer limited account credit or a payment method with spending limits and alerts to reduce financial exposure.
- Independently inspect and test the package implementation, particularly the claimed purchase-token gate, before enabling production credentials.
- Pin
