T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/film-search.js:909- Finding
Unrestricted URL Resolution Enables Server-Side Request Forgery
- Content
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HTTP {r.status_code}\n') return [] html = r.text ``` ### Technical Analysis The `resolve` command accepts a user-controlled URL and passes it directly to `fetch`. It does not validate: - The URL scheme - The destination hostname or resolved IP address - Loopback, private, link-local, multicast, or reserved networks - Cloud instance metadata addresses - Redirect destinations - DNS rebinding between validation and connection Because redirects are explicitly followed, an apparently public URL can redirect the request to an internal service. The Python extraction component has the same underlying weakness and accepts page URLs from JSON supplied through standard input. The response body is parsed for cloud-drive links rather than returned in full. This limits direct response disclosure, but does not prevent SSRF. An attacker may still infer service availability through st ...[truncated 1435 chars]- Remediation
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