T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:22
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Source and Dependency Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 22–24 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party installation and dependency execution **Risk Level**: Medium ```bash git clone https://github.com/pasogott/whcli.git cd whcli uv sync ``` The project also declares a Homebrew installation from the mutable custom tap `pasogott/tap/whcli` at lines 5 and 16. ### Technical Analysis The documented source installation clones the default branch of an externally controlled GitHub repository without pinning an immutable commit or verifying a cryptographic signature or checksum. It then invokes `uv sync`, which resolves and installs project dependencies that are not included in the audited artifact. Consequently, the code installed by this procedure can change after the Skill has been reviewed. The same trust issue applies to the custom Homebrew tap: the formula and referenced artifacts may change independently of this repository. The audited project contains only `SKILL.md`, so the remote implementation, dependency lock state, package build hooks, and Homebrew formula could not be verified. This is a supply-chain risk rather than evidence that the current upstream project is malicious. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the referenced GitHub repository, custom Homebrew tap, release infrastructure, maintainer account, or an unpinned transitive dependency. 2. The attacker modifies the default branch, package metadata, formula, release artifact, or dependency content to include malicious code. 3. A user or Agent follows the installation instructions and runs `git clone` followed by `uv sync`, or installs through the custom Homebrew tap. 4. The package manager retrieves the modified content because no immutable version or independent integrity verification is required by the instructions. 5. Malicious installation hooks, build logic, dependencies, or installed executables run with the privileges of the installing user. ### Impact Assessment Succ ...[truncated 607 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the source installation to a reviewed immutable commit or signed release tag rather than cloning and executing the default branch. 2. Publish cryptographic checksums for release artifacts and require verification before installation. 3. Commit and enforce a dependency lockfile containing exact versions and integrity hashes. 4. Review and restrict dependency build scripts and installation hooks. 5. Pin the Homebrew formula to a specific release with a verified SHA-256 checksum. 6. Prefer a trusted package registry or independently reviewed distribution channel over a mutable personal tap. 7. Run installation without elevated privileges and in an isolated environment where practical. 8. Add automated dependency and release-integrity scanning to detect compromised or unexpectedly changed upstream components.