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Security audit

Console Agent

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent guide for a cloud-backed AI debugging library, but its default behavior can automatically send caller source code and rich runtime data to an external AI provider with limited upfront warning.

Install only if you are comfortable with prompts, context, attached files, logs, and caller source code being sent to the configured AI provider. For sensitive projects, disable includeCallerSource, prefer localOnly or Ollama where practical, avoid fire-and-forget in production paths, redact logs and objects before calling the agent, and pin reviewed package versions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
AGENTS.md:454
Finding

Caller Source Code Is Sent to a Cloud AI Provider by Default

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
AGENTS.md:295
Finding

File-Analysis Guidance Permits Unrestricted Transmission of Local Documents

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:76
Finding

Installation Instructions Use Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (13)

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Automatic source-file inclusion is a substantive data-exfiltration risk because surrounding code often contains secrets, credentials, internal endpoints, security controls, and proprietary implementation details. In a runtime utility marketed as drop-in and zero-config, this default is especially dangerous because it can occur broadly and invisibly across many call sites.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documentation presents conflicting security semantics: personas list 'default tools' while the tools section says tools are opt-in only. In an agent skill, ambiguity around whether web search, code execution, or file analysis may run automatically can cause developers to unintentionally enable external actions or data transfer they did not consent to.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · AGENTS.md (reported line 287)May include surrounding context.

javascript
const result = await console.agent(
  "Summarize the API at https://api.example.com/docs",
  null,
  { tools: ['url_context'] }
);

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The examples encourage attaching PDFs, images, and code files for AI analysis but do not clearly warn that these files may be transmitted to an external service. This can lead developers to send sensitive documents or regulated data without informed consent or review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The document normalizes automatic source-code transmission without an upfront, prominent privacy warning. Users may adopt the library assuming ordinary logging-like behavior and not realize code is sent to a remote model provider, creating hidden privacy and compliance risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The troubleshooting guidance recommends sending rich request, response, logs, and environment context, which commonly include PII, credentials, tokens, and operationally sensitive metadata. Encouraging broad context sharing to remote AI increases the likelihood of oversharing sensitive production data during debugging.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The introductory material identifies the package and provider but does not clearly warn that using the skill may transmit prompts, code, logs, runtime context, or source material to Google-hosted models and tools. Given the skill's stated use cases—debugging, security auditing, intelligent logging, and runtime analysis—users may disclose sensitive information without realizing it leaves the local environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The 'When to Apply' section is broad enough to trigger on many ordinary programming, debugging, and security-related requests, which can cause this skill to be invoked in contexts where users did not explicitly ask to use an external AI agent. In this skill, overbroad activation matters because the examples and defaults encourage sending code, logs, runtime context, and possibly source files to a cloud provider.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The testing and debugging snippets promote forwarding raw order objects, batch inputs/outputs, and error details to the agent, normalizing transmission of potentially sensitive transactional and test data. In practice, test fixtures and failure payloads often contain realistic customer data, secrets, and internal system details, so this creates a meaningful confidentiality risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The file attachment example encourages reading a local PDF and passing its raw bytes to the agent without a nearby warning that the document contents may be uploaded to an external provider for analysis. This creates a direct path for exfiltration of confidential local files under normal usage patterns, especially because the example is framed as a standard feature rather than a sensitive operation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

These best-practice examples explicitly encourage sending rich debugging context such as errors, orders, users, timestamps, environments, and recent logs. Even with anonymization enabled, such data often contains secrets, personal data, tokens, internal identifiers, or business-sensitive content that automated stripping may miss, making semantic data leakage likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The troubleshooting example advises sending full request objects, response bodies, logs, and environment context when diagnosing API 500s. That pattern is especially risky because such payloads commonly include credentials, session tokens, PII, internal endpoints, and stack traces, and users may follow the example during production incidents when sensitive data is most exposed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill documents automatic inclusion of the caller's source file as default behavior, which can transmit surrounding code, comments, secrets, and business logic to the AI service without deliberate opt-in. Even with anonymization claims elsewhere, source code may contain proprietary logic or sensitive literals that are not reliably scrubbed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.