T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Error
- Location
install.js:758- Finding
Shell Command Injection Through Unescaped CLI Arguments and Repository URLs
- Content
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a.startsWith('--')); const rawTarget = process.argv[2]; execSync(`ldm install ${rawTarget} ${flags.join(' ')}`, { stdio: 'inherit' }); ``` The same unsafe delegation is repeated after bootstrapping LDM OS: ```javascript const flags = args.filter(a => a.startsWith('--')); const rawTarget = process.argv[2]; try { execSync(`ldm install ${rawTarget} ${flags.join(' ')}`, { stdio: 'inherit' }); process.exit(0); } catch (delegateErr) { if (!JSON_OUTPUT) console.error(' ldm install failed. Falling back to standalone installer.'); } ``` The standalone clone fallback also interpolates an untrusted URL into shell commands: ```javascript if (target.startsWith('http') || target.startsWith('git@') || target.match(/^[\w-]+\/[\w.-]+$/)) { const isShorthand = target.match(/^[\w-]+\/[\w.-]+$/); const httpsUrl = isShorthand ? `https://github.com/${target}.git` : target; const sshUrl = isShorthand ? `git@github.com:${target}.git` : target.replace(/^https:\/\/github\.com\//, 'git@github.com:'); const repoName = basename(httpsUrl).replace('.git', ''); repoPath = join('/tmp', `wip-install-${repoName}`); try { if (existsSync(repoPath)) { execSync(`rm -rf "${repoPath}"`); } try { execSync(`git clone "${httpsUrl}" "${repoPath}"`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); } catch { if (existsSync(repoPath)) execSync(`rm -rf "${repoPath}"`); execSync(`git clone "${sshUrl}" "${repoPath}"`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); } } } ``` ### Technical Analysis `execSync()` executes string commands through a shell. `rawTarget`, arbitrary arguments beginning with `--`, `httpsUrl`, and `sshUrl` are incorporated without shell escaping or strict validation. Quotation marks around the clone UR ...[truncated 1298 chars]- Remediation
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