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Security audit

Wip Repos

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill has a coherent repo-organization purpose, but it also contains under-documented commands and boundary weaknesses that can move or write files beyond what users would reasonably expect.

Install only if you trust the manifests and repositories it will read. Run check and sync --dry-run first, avoid compliance --fix and claude unless you have reviewed their diffs, and do not use this against third-party or mixed-ownership repo sets until path containment and CLAUDE.md metadata handling are fixed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
core.mjs:137
Finding

Manifest path traversal allows filesystem moves and writes outside the repository root

Content
View full analysis
manifest path const remoteToManifest = new Map(); for (const [mPath, info] of Object.entries(manifest.repos)) { if (info.remote) { remoteToManifest.set(info.remote, mPath); } } // For each repo on disk, check if its remote matches a manifest entry at a different path for (const diskPath of diskPaths) { const fullPath = join(reposRoot, diskPath); const gitConfig = join(fullPath, '.git', 'config'); if (!existsSync(gitConfig)) continue; const configText = readFileSync(gitConfig, 'utf8'); const match = configText.match(/url\s*=\s*.*[:/]([^/]+\/[^/\s.]+?)(?:\.git)?\s*$/m); if (!match) continue; const remote = match[1]; const expectedPath = remoteToManifest.get(remote); if (expectedPath && expectedPath !== diskPath) { moves.push({ from: diskPath, to: expectedPath, remote, fromFull: fullPath, toFull: join(reposRoot, expectedPath), }); } } return moves; } export function executeSync(moves, reposRoot) { const results = []; for (const move of moves) { const parentDir = dirname(move.toFull); if (!existsSync(parentDir)) { mkdirSync(parentDir, { recursive: true }); } if (existsSync(move.toFull)) { results.push({ ...move, status: 'skipped', reason: 'target exists' }); continue; } try { renameSync(move.fromFull, move.toFull); results.push({ ...move, status: 'moved' }); } catch (err) { results.push({ ...move, status: 'error' ...[truncated 4448 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
claude.mjs:104
Finding

Untrusted repository metadata is persisted into agent instruction files

Content
View full analysis
0) interfaces.push('CLI'); if (pkg?.main || pkg?.exports) interfaces.push('Module'); if (existsSync(join(repoPath, 'mcp-server.mjs')) || existsSync(join(repoPath, 'dist', 'mcp-server.js'))) interfaces.push('MCP'); if (existsSync(join(repoPath, 'openclaw.plugin.json'))) interfaces.push('OpenClaw Plugin'); if (existsSync(join(repoPath, 'SKILL.md'))) interfaces.push('Skill'); return { name, description, version, interfaces, binCommands, dirs, scripts, path: repoPath, }; } ``` The metadata is directly rendered as Markdown: ```javascript function generateEcosystem(targetMeta, relevantMetas) { const lines = []; for (const m of relevantMetas) { const relPath = basename(m.path); lines.push(`### ${m.name}`); lines.push(`**Path:** \`${relPath}\``); if (m.description) lines.push(m.description); if (m.interfaces.length > 0) lines.push(`**Interfaces:** ${m.interfaces.join(', ')}`); if (m.binCommands.length > 0) lines.push(`**CLI:** ${m.binCommands.join(', ')}`); if (m.version) lines.push(`**Version:** ${m.version}`); lines.push(''); } return lines.join('\n').trim(); } function upda ...[truncated 4660 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (12)

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · claude.mjs (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

js
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const TEMPLATE_PATH = join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'templates', 'repo-claude-md.template');
const START_MARKER = '<!-- wip-repos:start -->';
const END_MARKER = '<!-- wip-repos:end -->';

function readJSON(path) {

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This markdown file documents that the filesystem 'adapts' to the manifest and that folders 'snap back' or are moved on sync, which affects user data layout and system state. Although --dry-run is shown, there is no explicit warning that wip-repos sync will make real filesystem changes and should be used carefully.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill documents a sync command that will actively move repositories on disk to match a manifest, but it does not clearly warn that running it can modify the filesystem beyond a preview step. In an agent-driven context, terse operational guidance can cause a user or autonomous system to invoke the mutating command directly, leading to unintended repo moves, broken paths, or workflow disruption.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The CLI imports and exposes a claude command that is not documented in the header comments or usage output, creating a hidden capability outside the stated skill scope. Undocumented commands are dangerous because they bypass operator expectations and review boundaries, and they often become a path for unvetted agent behavior or unexpected downstream actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes this skill as a 'Repo manifest reconciler' that makes repos-manifest.json the single source of truth for repo organization. However, the CLI also provides compliance and --fix functionality to scan repositories for licensing/CLA/npmignore files and create missing files, which is a separate repo compliance management capability rather than manifest reconciliation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The code hardcodes legal and licensing defaults for a specific organization and can create or update compliance artifacts such as CLA.md, .license-guard.json, and .npmignore. If run against third-party or mixed-ownership repositories, it may inject incorrect legal terms or packaging rules, causing policy corruption, legal misrepresentation, and accidental changes that are hard to detect at scale.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill’s stated purpose is manifest reconciliation, but this section adds compliance auditing and auto-remediation that writes organization-specific files into repositories. In an agent setting, this expands the write surface beyond expected scope and can silently modify unrelated repos, creating integrity and governance risk if the skill is invoked with broad filesystem access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The repos_add and repos_move tool definitions describe modifying the manifest, and their handlers execute those changes, but this file provides no confirmation prompt or explicit warning that user data will be altered. Although the success messages appear after execution, they do not disclose the write beforehand, and there is no docstring-level warning here about the manifest being modified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The module docstring lists only check, sync, add, move, and tree, but the code also implements compliance, watchdog, and claude. This documentation does not merely lack detail; it presents an incomplete and narrower set of capabilities than the executable CLI actually exposes, which can mislead reviewers about the skill's intent and operational scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The inline comment states that underscore-prefixed folders sort to the top. But when a starts with '_' and b does not, the comparator returns 1, which places a after b in ascending sort order, contradicting the documented intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unpinned Dependencies

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The dependency is specified with a caret range (^1.0.0), which permits automatic installation of newer minor and patch releases. This weakens supply-chain reproducibility and can unexpectedly introduce vulnerable or malicious upstream code without any manifest change in this package.

Content

Scanner excerpt · package.json (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

json
"directory": "tools/wip-repos"
  },
  "dependencies": {
    "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.0.0"
  }
}

Unverifiable Dependency: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk has 3 known advisory(ies) (CVE-2026-25536 (@modelcontextprotocol/sdk has cross-client data leak via shared server/transport); CVE-2026-0621 (Anthropic's MCP TypeScript SDK has a ReDoS vulnerability); CVE-2025-66414 (Model Context Protocol (MCP) TypeScript SDK does not enable DNS rebinding protec)), but the manifest does not pin a version, so it is unknown whether the installed release is affected

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The package depends on @modelcontextprotocol/sdk without pinning to a known-safe version, while the dependency family has multiple published advisories. Because the manifest allows version drift, consumers may install an affected release, exposing them to issues such as cross-client data leakage, ReDoS, or DNS rebinding weaknesses depending on runtime usage.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.