T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
format.mjs:93- Finding
Generated README Injects Persistent Instructions into Downstream AI Sessions
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This README formatter is mostly purpose-aligned, but its deploy path contains a real command-injection risk when run on an untrusted repository.
Install only if you trust the source and use it on repositories you control. Run --dry-run first, review generated README-init-* files, and avoid --deploy on untrusted checkouts until the shell command construction is fixed to use an argument-array API such as execFileSync.
format.mjs:93Generated README Injects Persistent Instructions into Downstream AI Sessions
format.mjs:350Repository-Controlled Filename Enables Shell Command Injection During Deployment
The manifest description says the skill can "Reformat any repo's README," which is a broad natural-language activation description without constraints on when it should or should not be invoked. Because this is a markdown/manifest file, the lack of narrower trigger conditions or exclusion examples increases the chance of unintended invocation for general README-related requests.
The skill explicitly states that it rewrites README.md and moves technical content to TECHNICAL.md, but it lacks a prominent warning about these destructive file modifications. In agent-driven workflows, unclear write-side effects can cause unintended documentation changes, content relocation, and CI/review disruption, especially if invoked automatically or on the wrong repository.
The manifest description says the skill can reformat "any repo's README," but it does not define activation constraints, trigger phrases, or exclusion conditions. In a manifest file, this broad natural-language scope can make invocation boundaries unclear and increases the chance of unintended activation for general README-related requests.