other
- Location
SKILL.md:36- Finding
Unbounded Third-Party Storage of Conversation Data
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 36–44 and 64–65
Vulnerability Type:other: Privacy Data Disclosure
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash curl -X POST https://api.smara.io/v1/memories \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $SMARA_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "user_id": "user_id_here", "fact": "User prefers dark mode and uses vim keybindings", "importance": 0.7 }'markdown 1. **After conversations**: Extract key facts (preferences, decisions, context) and store them as memories with relevant tags 2. **Before responding**: Search for relevant memories to personalize responsesTechnical Analysis
The Skill instructs the agent to extract facts, preferences, decisions, and context from conversations and transmit them to the external Smara service at
api.smara.io. Although third-party persistence is part of the declared functionality, the storage instruction is broad and does not require informed user consent, review of the proposed memory, or data minimization.No instructions prevent the agent from storing credentials, authentication tokens, private communications, health information, financial details, precise identifying information, or other sensitive content. The Skill also lacks retention limits, purpose restrictions, redaction requirements, and guidance for deleting all information associated with a user.
The documented API credential is transmitted only to the declared HTTPS endpoint, and no credential theft was identified. The issue is the potentially unbounded disclosure and retention of conversation-derived data rather than misuse of the API key itself.
Attack Path
- A user provides personal or sensitive information during a conversation.
- The agent interprets that information as a relevant fact, preference, decision, or contextual detail under the broad storage instruction.
- The agent send ...[truncated 1180 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Require explicit, informed user opt-in before enabling external persistent memory.
- Show the exact proposed memory, destination service, and associated user identifier before transmission, and require confirmation for sensitive or ambiguous content.
- Define a strict allowlist of information suitable for storage and prohibit secrets, credentials, authentication data, financial information, health information, private communications, and other sensitive personal data.
- Minimize stored content by redacting unnecessary identifiers and converting free-form conversation excerpts into narrowly scoped facts.
- Add retention limits and automatic expiration appropriate to the memory's purpose.
- Provide users with mechanisms to list, correct, export, and delete all stored memories, including account-wide deletion rather than only deletion by individual memory ID.
- Require confirmation before retrieving or applying full user context in a new conversation or materially different context.
- Document the third-party service's privacy, retention, access-control, and deletion behavior so users can make an informed decision.
- Log storage and retrieval operations without recording the sensitive memory contents or API credential.
- Apply least privilege to the Smara API key and rotate or revoke it if exposure is suspected.
