Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill does what it claims: it sends user-requested image, template, and screenshot jobs to PropzAPI using the user's API key.
Install only if you intend to use PropzAPI as a third-party rendering service. Avoid sending confidential page URLs, private HTML, or sensitive template variables unless you are comfortable processing that data through PropzAPI, and monitor credit usage because render and screenshot calls consume credits.
The skill declares access to environment secrets and network communication but does not define any explicit tool scope such as allowed tools or permissions. That weakens least-privilege controls and makes it harder for a host to constrain where secrets may be used or what outbound actions the skill is permitted to perform.
The screenshot function sends the provided URL to the propzapi service via _post, which is a network operation involving user or system data. Although the function docstring explains what it does, it does not explicitly warn that the URL will be sent to a third-party external service, so there is no clear disclosure of the data-sharing aspect.
The create_template function posts user-provided HTML, dimensions, and variables to the remote propzapi service. The docstring describes the feature but does not clearly warn that potentially sensitive template contents are uploaded to a third-party service, which is a safety-relevant disclosure omission for network transmission of user data.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
@patch("handler.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_embed_url_posts_v1_embed_url(self, mock_urlopen):
mock_urlopen.return_value = _mock_response(b'{"url": "https://api.propzapi.com/r/signed"}')
with patch.dict(os.environ, {"PROPZAPI_KEY": "test_key"}):
handler.embed_url(template="tpl_abc", modifications={"title": "Hi"})
req = _req(mock_urlopen)
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
@patch("handler.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_embed_url_posts_v1_embed_url(self, mock_urlopen):
mock_urlopen.return_value = _mock_response(b'{"url": "https://api.propzapi.com/r/signed"}')
with patch.dict(os.environ, {"PROPZAPI_KEY": "test_key"}):
handler.embed_url(template="tpl_abc", modifications={"title": "Hi"})
req = _req(mock_urlopen)
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
@patch("handler.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_embed_url_posts_v1_embed_url(self, mock_urlopen):
mock_urlopen.return_value = _mock_response(b'{"url": "https://api.propzapi.com/r/signed"}')
with patch.dict(os.environ, {"PROPZAPI_KEY": "test_key"}):
handler.embed_url(template="tpl_abc", modifications={"title": "Hi"})
req = _req(mock_urlopen)
L073 states that the base URL is hardcoded so the key never reaches any other host. However, L079 documents obtaining a key with POST /v1/register, implying an additional API interaction path not covered by the narrow claim. This is a documentation-level contradiction about network scope, even though it may be benign.
This code file exercises HTTP requests to external PropzAPI endpoints and includes access to the PROPZAPI_KEY credential, but there is no user-facing warning, confirmation, or explanatory comment about transmitting request data to a third-party service. For SQP-2 on code files, network calls that transmit user or system data and access to sensitive credentials should have some visible disclosure unless clearly covered elsewhere.
No suspicious patterns detected.