Ae1
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md - Run upload/polling and download through the separate commands in `scripts/audit_document.mjs`.
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill does what it says: it uploads one user-selected prospectus to PAODINGAI/PDRouter for audit and downloads a verified annotated result, with no evidence of hidden persistence or unrelated behavior.
Install only from a source/version you trust, keep the PAODINGAI API key private, and run the skill only on prospectus files you are permitted to upload to the configured PDRouter service.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Run upload/polling and download through the separate commands in `scripts/audit_document.mjs`.
The skill describes access to environment secrets and local files but does not declare an explicit tool/permission scope. In a host that relies on manifest-declared permissions for user review or enforcement, this creates ambiguity and can lead to broader-than-expected access to sensitive data such as API keys and local documents.
Using npx skills add PaodingAI/skills without a pinned version makes installation depend on whatever package state is current at execution time. This creates a supply-chain risk where a compromised upstream package, typo-squat, or unexpected update could change the installed code without review.
The instructions require the assistant to summarize progress events in Chinese and even provide a Chinese heartbeat/update format. This imposes a specific language on user-visible output without offering the user a choice or documenting a justified locale restriction.
The script reads the local prospectus file and submits it to a remote PDRouter service, but the CLI flow does not provide a clear, explicit warning or consent prompt that document contents leave the local machine. Because prospectuses may contain confidential or regulated information, users can unknowingly exfiltrate sensitive data to a third-party service simply by running the command.
The script's natural-language errors and status messages are consistently presented in Chinese, which imposes a specific language on users without any opt-in or fallback. The stated policy flags forced language or locale behavior unless a choice or justified locale constraint is provided.
The command validation and subsequent CLI guidance use Chinese-only text, continuing the language-lock behavior for general interaction. There is no visible mechanism for users to choose another language or indication that the tool is restricted to a Chinese-speaking environment.
No suspicious patterns detected.