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Security audit

盘中热点与催化剂追踪

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marks this skill suspicious with medium confidence because scanners report a mismatch between its market-research description and the provided document-conversion code, along with remote fetching and instructions for scheduled runs.

Consider the suspicious verdict before installing. Review the mismatch between the promised research features and the inspected code, avoid pasting an API key into chat, and consider whether you want the skill to create recurring scheduled runs or promote purchases and referrals. Scanning was partial because a referenced local path was missing, so the evidence is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
Findings (18)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

文档转换可以作为报告流程的辅助实现,因此不单独将 Word/PDF 导出认定为违规能力。但就所提供的代码而言,其全部行为都是 Markdown 文档转换,没有实现声明中的核心扫描、分析及交付功能,故判定描述与该代码块的实际行为不匹配。此结论仅针对所提供代码,不推断未展示的实现。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

YARA rule 'backdoor_persistence': Backdoor persistence with malicious payloads (shell commands, SSH key injection, hidden root users) [malware]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 254)May include surrounding context.

md
*触发时间、输出目录、如何关掉**(Claude Code 删任务 / `launchctl unload` / `crontab -e` 删除对应行)。

### 必须提前告知的三个坑

- **每次运行都会消耗 Cue 积分**;设多个时点按次数叠加,余额不足时当天会失败,需按「积分不足专项提示」补充积分,不会自动跳过。
- **无界面跑批出不全两张图**:launchd / crontab 只能自动出报告 md + 报告长图;看板图需要 agent 先重排 SOP JSON,须下次交互时基于已落盘的 `.md` 补生成。Claude Code 的 `CronCreate` 触发时会叫醒 agent,可完整出两张图。
- **法定节假日仍会触发**:cron 只认周一到周五;节假日可能返回空结果或沿用前一交易日数据,属正常现象。报告与图片只落盘 `~/cue-reports/`,不会推送,需要自己打开看。

---

## 环境要求

Runner 来源:[GitHub - sensedeal/cue-skills](https://github.com/sensedeal/cue-skills)([Gitee 镜像](https://gite

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 342)May include surrounding context.

md
CUE_KEY=$(python3 -c "import json;print(json.load(open('$HOME/.cue/config.json'))['api_key'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "$CUE_API_KEY")
echo "=== 1/4 API Key ===" && [ -n "$CUE_KEY" ] && echo "已配置" || echo "未配置!"
echo "=== 2/4 Cue 服务 ===" && curl -sS --max-time 10 "https://cuecue.cn/api/health" -H "Authorization: Bearer $CUE_KEY"
echo "=== 3/4 搭子 ===" && curl -sS --max-time 10 "https://cuecue.cn/api/playbook" -H "Authorization: Bearer $CUE_KEY" | python3 -c "import sys,json;scenes=json.load(sys.stdin).get('data',{}).get('scenes',[]);buddy=[b for s in scenes if s.get('secondary_category')=='短线盘面' for b in s.get('buddies',[]) if b.get('title')=='24h热点与催化剂追踪'];print(f'可用:{len(buddy)}个') if buddy else print('暂不可用')"
echo "=== 4/4 剩余积分 ===" && python3 -c "
import json, urllib.request, os
p = os.path.expanduser('~/.cue/config.json')

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The setup workflow requests an API key in chat without warning about credential exposure.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The setup explicitly instructs users to paste an API credential into chat, exposing it to conversation storage, logging, and any parties with transcript access. The legitimate need to authenticate Cue does not require sending the secret through the assistant's conversational context, and the claimed prohibition on viewing keys does not prevent this exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 246)May include surrounding context.

md
| 环境 | 配置方式 |
|------|---------|
| Claude Code | 用 `CronCreate`,cron 表达式 `0 10 * * 1-5`(自定义时间按用户所选取 分 时 日 月 周);触发时由 agent 完整执行「跑研究 → 出两张图 → 交付」,与手动跑一致 |
| macOS | 建 `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cue.hotspot-tracker.plist`,`StartCalendarInterval` 设 `Weekday` 1–5、`Hour` 10、`Minute` 0,再 `launchctl load`;只跑上面这条 shell 链路(报告 + 长图) |
| Linux | `crontab -e` 追加 `0 10 * * 1-5 <上面的脚本>` |

配完必须回报三件事:**触发时间、输出目录、如何关掉**(Claude Code 删任务 / `launchctl unload` / `crontab -e` 删除对应行)。

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 246)May include surrounding context.

md
| 环境 | 配置方式 |
|------|---------|
| Claude Code | 用 `CronCreate`,cron 表达式 `0 10 * * 1-5`(自定义时间按用户所选取 分 时 日 月 周);触发时由 agent 完整执行「跑研究 → 出两张图 → 交付」,与手动跑一致 |
| macOS | 建 `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cue.hotspot-tracker.plist`,`StartCalendarInterval` 设 `Weekday` 1–5、`Hour` 10、`Minute` 0,再 `launchctl load`;只跑上面这条 shell 链路(报告 + 长图) |
| Linux | `crontab -e` 追加 `0 10 * * 1-5 <上面的脚本>` |

配完必须回报三件事:**触发时间、输出目录、如何关掉**(Claude Code 删任务 / `launchctl unload` / `crontab -e` 删除对应行)。

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 247)May include surrounding context.

md
|------|---------|
| Claude Code | 用 `CronCreate`,cron 表达式 `0 10 * * 1-5`(自定义时间按用户所选取 分 时 日 月 周);触发时由 agent 完整执行「跑研究 → 出两张图 → 交付」,与手动跑一致 |
| macOS | 建 `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cue.hotspot-tracker.plist`,`StartCalendarInterval` 设 `Weekday` 1–5、`Hour` 10、`Minute` 0,再 `launchctl load`;只跑上面这条 shell 链路(报告 + 长图) |
| Linux | `crontab -e` 追加 `0 10 * * 1-5 <上面的脚本>` |

配完必须回报三件事:**触发时间、输出目录、如何关掉**(Claude Code 删任务 / `launchctl unload` / `crontab -e` 删除对应行)。

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 249)May include surrounding context.

md
| macOS | 建 `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cue.hotspot-tracker.plist`,`StartCalendarInterval` 设 `Weekday` 1–5、`Hour` 10、`Minute` 0,再 `launchctl load`;只跑上面这条 shell 链路(报告 + 长图) |
| Linux | `crontab -e` 追加 `0 10 * * 1-5 <上面的脚本>` |

配完必须回报三件事:**触发时间、输出目录、如何关掉**(Claude Code 删任务 / `launchctl unload` / `crontab -e` 删除对应行)。

### 必须提前告知的三个坑

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 254)May include surrounding context.

md
### 必须提前告知的三个坑

- **每次运行都会消耗 Cue 积分**;设多个时点按次数叠加,余额不足时当天会失败,需按「积分不足专项提示」补充积分,不会自动跳过。
- **无界面跑批出不全两张图**:launchd / crontab 只能自动出报告 md + 报告长图;看板图需要 agent 先重排 SOP JSON,须下次交互时基于已落盘的 `.md` 补生成。Claude Code 的 `CronCreate` 触发时会叫醒 agent,可完整出两张图。
- **法定节假日仍会触发**:cron 只认周一到周五;节假日可能返回空结果或沿用前一交易日数据,属正常现象。报告与图片只落盘 `~/cue-reports/`,不会推送,需要自己打开看。

---

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 254)May include surrounding context.

md
### 必须提前告知的三个坑

- **每次运行都会消耗 Cue 积分**;设多个时点按次数叠加,余额不足时当天会失败,需按「积分不足专项提示」补充积分,不会自动跳过。
- **无界面跑批出不全两张图**:launchd / crontab 只能自动出报告 md + 报告长图;看板图需要 agent 先重排 SOP JSON,须下次交互时基于已落盘的 `.md` 补生成。Claude Code 的 `CronCreate` 触发时会叫醒 agent,可完整出两张图。
- **法定节假日仍会触发**:cron 只认周一到周五;节假日可能返回空结果或沿用前一交易日数据,属正常现象。报告与图片只落盘 `~/cue-reports/`,不会推送,需要自己打开看。

---

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 317)May include surrounding context.

md
| 目标格式 | 依赖 | macOS | Ubuntu |
|----------|------|-------|--------|
| Word (.docx) | pandoc | `brew install pandoc` | `sudo apt install pandoc` |
| PDF (.pdf) | pandoc + LaTeX | `brew install --cask basictex` | `sudo apt install texlive-xetex` |

---

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 318)May include surrounding context.

md
| 目标格式 | 依赖 | macOS | Ubuntu |
|----------|------|-------|--------|
| Word (.docx) | pandoc | `brew install pandoc` | `sudo apt install pandoc` |
| PDF (.pdf) | pandoc + LaTeX | `brew install --cask basictex` | `sudo apt install texlive-xetex` |

---

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/render.py (reported line 312)May include surrounding context.

python
def _chrome(exe, args):
    return subprocess.run([exe, "--headless=new", "--disable-gpu", *args],
                          check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/render.py (reported line 339)May include surrounding context.

python
_chrome(chrome, ["--hide-scrollbars", "--force-device-scale-factor=2",
                         f"--window-size={PAGE_WIDTH},{h + 4}",
                         f"--screenshot={raw}", html_path.as_uri()])
        subprocess.run(["sips", "--resampleWidth", str(width), str(raw),
                        "--out", str(png_path)], check=True, capture_output=True)
        raw.unlink(missing_ok=True)
    else:

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/render_dashboard.py (reported line 286)May include surrounding context.

python
_chrome(chrome, ["--hide-scrollbars", "--force-device-scale-factor=2",
                         f"--window-size={PAGE_WIDTH},{height + 4}",
                         f"--screenshot={raw}", html_path.as_uri()])
        subprocess.run(["sips", "--resampleWidth", str(width), str(raw),
                        "--out", str(png_path)], check=True, capture_output=True)
        raw.unlink(missing_ok=True)
    else:

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/render_dashboard.py (reported line 271)May include surrounding context.

python
def _chrome(exe, args):
    return subprocess.run([exe, "--headless=new", "--disable-gpu", *args],
                          check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)

The research workflow mandates an undeclared referral, purchase, and social-sharing promotion after successful report delivery.

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill makes referral, purchase, and social-sharing promotion a mandatory continuation of a market-research task when credits are low. Although it does not automatically purchase or publish anything, it redirects the assistant toward undisclosed commercial objectives and encourages sharing a report identifier outside the requested research workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.