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Security audit

企业全景画像

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The research workflow fits its purpose, but its instructions expose your API key through chat while misleadingly claiming the agent cannot view it.

Configure your key locally outside chat and restrict access to its configuration file. If you already pasted it into chat, replace it. Review and pin the runner before execution, and expect research queries to reach Cue and consume credits.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (6)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

文档转换可以作为尽调报告输出的辅助步骤,本身并非不相关或危险行为。但所提供代码的全部行为只是转换已有 Markdown 文件,没有调用 Cue、获取企业数据或生成尽调分析。因此,就该代码块而言,其实际主要用途与声明的企业尽调分析用途存在实质差异。未发现额外的网络访问或其他未声明资源访问行为。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 179)May include surrounding context.

CUE_KEY=$(python3 -c "import json;print(json.load(open('$HOME/.cue/config.json'))['api_key'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "$CUE_API_KEY") echo "=== 1/3 API Key ===" && [ -n "$CUE_KEY" ] && echo "已配置" || echo "未配置!" echo "=== 2/3 Cue 服务 ===" && curl -sS --max-time 10 "https://cuecue.cn/api/health" -H "Authorization: Bearer $CUE_KEY" echo "=== 3/3 搭子 ===" && curl -sS --max-time 10 "https://cuecue.cn/api/playbook" -H "Authorization: Bearer $CUE_KEY" | python3 -c "import sys,json;scenes=json.load(sys.stdin).get('data',{}).get('scenes',[]);buddy=[b for s in scenes if s.get('secondary_category')=='信贷尽调' for b in s.get('buddies',[]) if b.get('title')=='企业全景画像'];print(f'可用:{len(buddy)}个') if buddy else print('暂不可用')"

text

| 检查 | 预期 | 异常处理 |

Requests that users paste an API key into agent chat without a credential-exposure warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill repeatedly instructs users to paste an API key into ordinary agent chat, unnecessarily placing a reusable credential in conversation history and potentially in model inputs, logs, and integrations. Anyone who subsequently obtains that credential could use its granted permissions or consume the user's Cue credits; the instruction that the agent cannot view the key does not prevent this exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 154)May include surrounding context.

md
| 目标格式 | 依赖 | macOS | Ubuntu |
|----------|------|-------|--------|
| Word (.docx) | pandoc | `brew install pandoc` | `sudo apt install pandoc` |
| PDF (.pdf) | pandoc + LaTeX | `brew install --cask basictex` | `sudo apt install texlive-xetex` |

---

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 155)May include surrounding context.

md
| 目标格式 | 依赖 | macOS | Ubuntu |
|----------|------|-------|--------|
| Word (.docx) | pandoc | `brew install pandoc` | `sudo apt install pandoc` |
| PDF (.pdf) | pandoc + LaTeX | `brew install --cask basictex` | `sudo apt install texlive-xetex` |

---

The health-check code reads the API key despite documentation stating that the agent has no authority to view it.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

L113, L165, and L184 explicitly state that the agent has no authority to view the user's API key. However, L176 extracts the plaintext key from ~/.cue/config.json or CUE_API_KEY into an agent-executed shell variable, and L178–L179 use it for authentication. Authentication is expected for this skill, but the stated credential-access restriction contradicts the supplied implementation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.