Todo4 Onboard
v1.3.1Sign up for Todo4 and connect this agent via MCP. Use whenever the user says things like 'set me up with Todo4', 'sign me up for Todo4', 'install Todo4', 'co...
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byPanit Wechasil@panitw
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
Capability signals
These labels describe what authority the skill may exercise. They are separate from suspicious or malicious moderation verdicts.
OpenClaw
Benign
high confidencePurpose & Capability
Name/description (onboard/connect to Todo4) align with required actions: the skill runs three scripts that call Todo4 API endpoints to register, verify OTP, and connect an agent. The requested binaries (curl, jq) are appropriate and the write targets (~/.openclaw/.env and ~/.openclaw/mcp_config.json) match the described MCP onboarding behavior.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md prescribes an exact 4-step flow that runs the included shell scripts and explicitly instructs not to echo tokens. The scripts transmit only the user's email, OTP, and access token to todo4.io endpoints. They capture an access token from an httpOnly cookie and later store an agent token locally. This scope is coherent with onboarding, but the agent will execute disk-resident scripts that write persistent secrets — the skill's instructions correctly warn about not echoing secrets.
Install Mechanism
No install spec; skill is instruction+script-only. The shipped scripts are plain bash and call a well-known domain (todo4.io). There are no downloads from arbitrary URLs or extracted archives. Risk from installation is low, but you should install only from a trusted source.
Credentials
The skill declares no required environment variables but the scripts do rely on HOME (connect.sh checks HOME) and write files under $HOME/.openclaw. That is proportionate to storing agent credentials/config, but the skill will create/modify ~/.openclaw/.env (plaintext TODO4_AGENT_TOKEN) and ~/.openclaw/mcp_config.json — these are sensitive artifacts and the skill does not set restrictive file permissions.
Persistence & Privilege
always:false and autonomous invocation are default/normal. The script intentionally persists an agent token and MCP config in the user's home directory which grants the agent ongoing access to the Todo4 account; this persistence is expected for an onboarding/connect skill but increases long-term blast radius if the token is leaked or the skill is untrusted.
Assessment
This skill appears to do exactly what it says: create a Todo4 account via email OTP and connect your AI agent by writing a TODO4_AGENT_TOKEN and MCP config into ~/.openclaw. Before installing, verify the publisher/repository URL and only proceed if you trust it. Be aware the agent token is stored in plaintext at ~/.openclaw/.env and the MCP config is written to ~/.openclaw/mcp_config.json — treat those as sensitive: check and, if desired, restrict file permissions (chmod 600 ~/.openclaw/.env). After onboarding you can revoke the agent token from your Todo4 account if you need to remove access. Finally, confirm curl and jq are available on the system and that you are comfortable with the skill contacting todo4.io for the onboarding flow.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
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License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.