T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:27- Finding
Unpinned Dependencies and Runtime WebDriver Executable Downloads
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Selenium automation skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but it should be reviewed because it can submit forms/time entries and retain or expose sensitive data without enough user control or disclosure.
Install only in an isolated environment with non-sensitive test accounts or approved internal sites. Avoid passing real passwords or confidential form data on the command line, assume logs may contain entered values, and check for generated screenshots or scraped output files before running in shared or synchronized workspaces. Prefer pinned dependencies and preapproved browser drivers.
SKILL.md:27Unpinned Dependencies and Runtime WebDriver Executable Downloads
scripts/form_filler.py:139Sensitive Form Values Are Exposed Through Logs and Command-Line Arguments
scripts/form_filler.py:67Browser Sandbox Is Disabled While Processing Arbitrary URLs
scripts/time_logger.py:61Time Logger Unconditionally Stores Screenshots Containing Potentially Sensitive Data
The skill advertises web scraping, screenshots, cookie handling, and file output, all of which can collect, store, or expose sensitive information, yet it omits any privacy, consent, or local data handling warnings. In practice, this increases the risk of unauthorized collection of personal data, persistence of session material, or accidental storage of sensitive content in local files.
The skill advertises web scraping, screenshots, cookie handling, and file output, all of which can collect, store, or expose sensitive information, yet it omits any privacy, consent, or local data handling warnings. In practice, this increases the risk of unauthorized collection of personal data, persistence of session material, or accidental storage of sensitive content in local files.
The fill_form docstring says submit_button can be a "CSS selector or ID", but _submit_form only uses By.CSS_SELECTOR when the string starts with '.' and otherwise uses By.ID. This actively contradicts the documented interface because valid CSS selectors like '#submit', 'button[type="submit"]', or 'form button' will not be handled as documented unless they happen to start with a dot.
The script submits the form by default unless the user passes --no-submit, which can trigger irreversible actions on remote sites. While the CLI description says it automatically fills web forms, there is no explicit warning at the submission point or in argument help that the default behavior includes submitting data to the target site.
The script logs raw field values after sending them to the page, including likely secrets such as passwords, emails, phone numbers, and other PII. In an automation skill context, logs are often centrally collected or retained, so this can leak credentials and sensitive user data beyond the intended destination form.
The script saves screenshots of the loaded task page and the filled form to local files by default, which may capture sensitive project details, internal URLs, comments, dates, or personally identifiable information. Because this happens automatically and before/after form filling, it creates a quiet data retention and exposure risk on the operator's machine or shared workspace.
The script automatically submits a time entry once it locates likely form fields, without any final confirmation, preview, or domain allowlist check. In a browser automation context using heuristic selectors, this raises the risk of writing incorrect data to the wrong system or triggering unintended state-changing actions on pages that partially match the expected UI.
The CLI exposes a --screenshot flag that implies screenshots are optional, but the script always captures screenshots earlier in the workflow via log_time() and _fill_time_form(). This can mislead users into believing no local data capture occurs unless they opt in, resulting in unintended storage of potentially sensitive task content on disk.
The script automatically downloads browser drivers at runtime via webdriver_manager, causing undisclosed outbound network activity and execution of externally obtained binaries. In security-sensitive or restricted environments, this creates supply-chain and policy-compliance risk because remote artifacts are fetched implicitly rather than pinned, verified, or administrator-approved.
Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.
# Build form data dictionary
form_data = {}
for field in ['username', 'password', 'email', 'name', 'message', 'phone', 'company']:
value = getattr(args, field)
if value:
form_data[field] = value
The selector logic is tied to specific English and Chinese strings, which bakes in language assumptions rather than allowing users to specify or opt into their preferred locale. This can conflict with language/locale policy expectations when skills should not force or presume a language choice implicitly.
The script loads arbitrary user-supplied URLs in a real browser session, which causes network requests and may transmit system/browser metadata to external sites, but the user-facing description only says 'Automatically scrape web pages' without any warning about this behavior. There is logging after the page is loaded, but no prior disclosure of the network/privacy implications.
The docstring for _make_absolute_url says it will convert a relative URL to an absolute one, but the implementation only returns already-absolute URLs unchanged and otherwise returns the original relative URL. This is an active contradiction between the documented intent and actual behavior, not just missing detail.