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Security audit

minimax-tools

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed MiniMax image-analysis and web-search helper, with privacy, credential-storage, and installer-safety caveats but no artifact-backed malicious behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable sending chosen images, prompts, and search queries to MiniMax through the MCP package. Prefer an environment variable or secret manager over a plaintext config file, restrict config-file permissions if you use one, verify the uv installer and minimax-coding-plan-mcp package before running them, and avoid sending sensitive local images or confidential queries.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (11)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill documentation describes capabilities that access environment variables, read local files, use the network, and invoke shell commands, but it does not declare any permissions or constraints. This creates a trust gap: an agent may invoke a skill with broader side effects than users or policy expect, increasing the chance of unintended data exposure or command execution.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The trigger conditions are broad natural-language phrases like image analysis, web search, and querying latest information, which can match many unrelated user requests. Over-broad activation increases the risk that the skill is invoked unexpectedly and performs networked or shell-backed actions when a safer or narrower tool should have been used.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The script reads an API key from the environment or a local config file and forwards it to an external subprocess without any user-visible disclosure or trust validation of that subprocess. In a skill ecosystem, this expands the exposure of credentials to another executable that could log, misuse, or exfiltrate the key if the dependency is compromised.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill sends user-supplied image and prompt data to an external API via MCP, but the file provides no warning, consent flow, or data-handling notice. Because images and prompts may contain sensitive personal or proprietary information, silent transmission to a third party creates a real privacy and compliance risk.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The script loads a sensitive API key and injects it into a subprocess environment without any user-facing disclosure or trust check on the spawned MCP tool. If the MCP package or its execution path is compromised, the credential can be exfiltrated; this matters more here because the skill's purpose is network search, so external communication is expected and easier to hide.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
User query data is sent to an external service through the MCP subprocess, but the script provides no explicit notice, consent flow, or data handling warning. In a search skill this behavior is functionally expected, which lowers suspicion, but it is still a real privacy/security concern because user prompts may contain sensitive information and are transmitted off-host.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
配置 API Key：
```bash
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/config
cat > ~/.openclaw/config/minimax.json << EOF
{
  "api_key": "你的API密钥",
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/config cat > ~/.openclaw/config/minimax.json << EOF { "api_key": "你的API密钥", "output_path": "~/.openclaw/workspace/minimax-output" } EOF ``` 或者设置环境变量： ```bash export MINIMAX_A

External Script Fetching

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Content
which uvx

# 如果不存在，安装 uv
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
```

#### 步骤 2: 安装 MCP 服务器
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh

External Script Fetching

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Content
3. **依赖安装**（在新设备上执行）：
   ```bash
   # 安装 uv（如需要）
   curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
   
   # 安装 MCP 服务器
   uvx install minimax-coding-plan-mcp
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
which uvx

# 如果不存在，安装 uv
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
```

#### 步骤 2: 安装 MCP 服务器
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
| sh

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
3. **依赖安装**（在新设备上执行）：
   ```bash
   # 安装 uv（如需要）
   curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
   
   # 安装 MCP 服务器
   uvx install minimax-coding-plan-mcp
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
| sh

VirusTotal

61/61 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.