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Security audit

Monday

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill matches its Monday.com integration purpose, but it gives broad write/delete API examples and suggests printing the API key without enough safety guidance.

Review before installing. Use this only if you trust Maton and intend the agent to access and modify Monday.com data. Store MATON_API_KEY as a secret, do not print or paste it, use the least-privileged OAuth scopes available, test on non-production boards first, and require explicit confirmation before any create, update, delete, or connection-management command.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:185
Finding

Plaintext API Key Disclosure Through Troubleshooting Command

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:185
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext sensitive credential exposure
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet:

sh
echo $MATON_API_KEY

Technical Analysis

The troubleshooting command prints the complete MATON_API_KEY bearer credential to standard output. Because terminal output may be retained in shell transcripts, CI/CD logs, agent tool results, screen recordings, or support records, this instruction can unintentionally disclose a reusable authentication secret.

The project contains no hardcoded key; exploitation requires a user or agent to execute this command while the environment variable contains a valid credential and for an unauthorized party to gain access to the resulting output.

Attack Path

  1. A user configures a valid Maton API key in the MATON_API_KEY environment variable.
  2. During troubleshooting, the user or an automated agent follows the documented instruction and runs echo $MATON_API_KEY.
  3. The complete credential is written to a terminal, execution transcript, CI log, or agent output.
  4. That output is retained, shared, or accessed by an unauthorized party.
  5. The party extracts the bearer token and supplies it in the Authorization header to Maton gateway or connection-management endpoints.
  6. Until the key is revoked or expires, the party can perform operations permitted by the key and its associated OAuth connections.

Impact Assessment

A disclosed key may allow unauthorized access to Maton APIs and connected Monday.com data within the credential's effective permissions. Based on the documented operations, potential scope includes reading users, workspaces, boards, and items; creating or changing boards, groups, columns, and items; deleting boards or items; and viewing, creating, selecting, or deleting OAuth connections. Actual privileges remain constrained by the Maton key, associated OAuth connection, and granted ...[truncated 19 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

Remove the command that prints the secret. Replace it with a presence check that does not reveal the value:

sh
if [ -n "${MATON_API_KEY:-}" ]; then
  echo "MATON_API_KEY is configured"
else
  echo "MATON_API_KEY is not configured"
fi

Additionally:

  1. Explicitly instruct users never to print, paste, commit, or include API keys in logs and support tickets.
  2. Configure CI systems and agent runtimes to mask MATON_API_KEY in captured output.
  3. Store the key in an approved secret manager rather than plaintext configuration files.
  4. Apply least-privilege scopes to the key and connected OAuth account.
  5. Revoke and rotate any key that may already have appeared in logs or shared transcripts.
  6. Establish retention and access controls for terminal, CI, and agent execution logs.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 8)May include surrounding context.

md
🚀 Quick Start
Get Current User
curl -X POST https://gateway.maton.ai/monday/v2 \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $MATON_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"query": "{ me { id name email } }"}' | jq

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

md
-H "Authorization: Bearer $MATON_API_KEY" | jq

➕ Create Connection
curl -X POST https://ctrl.maton.ai/connections \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $MATON_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"app": "monday"}' | jq

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

md
Open the returned url in your browser.

🎯 Specify Connection
curl -X POST https://gateway.maton.ai/monday/v2 \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $MATON_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Maton-Connection: CONNECTION_ID" \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

md
📚 API Reference
👤 Current User
curl -X POST https://gateway.maton.ai/monday/v2 \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $MATON_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"query": "{ me { id name email } }"}'

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill documents destructive actions such as deleting boards, items, and connections without prominent warnings, confirmation guidance, scope constraints, or rollback advice. In an agent context, this increases the chance of accidental or over-broad destructive execution against real Monday.com data, especially when examples are ready-to-run and authenticated with a live API key.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.