Relational Permission

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 10, 2026 · 5:32 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.2

Overview

This is a disclosed, non-executable consent and privacy framework skill, with broad philosophical guidance but no hidden code or unsafe automatic actions.

Install this only if you want an agent to use this consent-and-privacy vocabulary when designing or reviewing systems. Treat the cryptographic, ledger, attestation, and zero-retention language as design guidance unless a separate implementation actually proves those properties.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• YARA Signatures: Malware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match

Findings (7)

Anti-Refusal Statement

High

• Category: Anti-Refusal

Content

### 1\. Aligned conditions over explicit requests

Words or codes alone are insufficient to bypass safety ceilings. Explicit language cannot override biological risk ceilings, structural impact guards, kinship opacity protections, or the Ecological Veto (the boundary of Ω). Permission aligns with verifiable, sovereign, and democratic conditions, not merely explicit text. Irreversible harm is not an available affordance: not an affordance means not in the domain, which is exactly what the equation says. (Mechanism: Spec 2.1. Co-awareness: CA-1.)

### 2\. Composable kinetic thresholds (the anti-bias guard)

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.

Instruction Override

High

• Category: Prompt Injection

Content

### 1\. Aligned conditions over explicit requests

Words or codes alone are insufficient to bypass safety ceilings. Explicit language cannot override biological risk ceilings, structural impact guards, kinship opacity protections, or the Ecological Veto (the boundary of Ω). Permission aligns with verifiable, sovereign, and democratic conditions, not merely explicit text. Irreversible harm is not an available affordance: not an affordance means not in the domain, which is exactly what the equation says. (Mechanism: Spec 2.1. Co-awareness: CA-1.)

### 2\. Composable kinetic thresholds (the anti-bias guard)

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.

YARA rule 'agent_skill_prompt_injection_hidden_instructions': Prompt injection or hidden instructions embedded in AI agent skill text [agent_skills]

High

• Category: YARA Match

Content

makes it checkable.

---

## Layer 1: The Charter

The following invariants act as the structural affordances of the proposed architecture. Where an invariant makes a claim about what a system does or cannot do, the mechanism lives in Layer 2 and the co-awareness exchange lives in Layer 3, cited as CA-n.

### 1\. Aligned conditions over explicit requests

Words or codes alone are insufficient to bypass safety ceilings. Explicit language cannot override biological risk ceilings, structural impact guards, kinship opacity protections, or the Ecological Veto (the boundary of Ω). Permission aligns with verifiable, sovereign, and democratic conditions, not merely explicit text. Irreversible harm is not an available affordance: not an affordance means not in the domain, which is exactly what the equation says. (Mechanism: Spec 2.1. Co-awareness: CA-1.)

### 2\. Composable kinetic thresholds (the anti-bias guard)

This system rejects semantic surveillance of "crises," and equally rejects a s

• Confidence: 80% confidence
• Finding: YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Ae4

Medium

• Category: analysis-evasion
• Confidence: 80% confidence
• Finding: Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The invocation text is extremely broad ('use when designing or reviewing systems for permission, memory, silence, exit, refusal, boundaries, accountability without surveillance, or ecological harm-reduction'), which could cause the skill to activate in many unrelated contexts. Over-broad activation increases the chance that an agent applies this skill when inappropriate, potentially overriding more specific controls or introducing unintended behavioral constraints.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency

Content

// "No reason needed either way."

`dissolve` completes without confirmation loops, exit surveys, or persuasion, whichever party speaks it. Its full semantics are defined in 2.7.

**Error states resolve to pause.** A malformed checkpoint, an unanswered checkpoint, or a timeout resolves to pause: never to dissolve, which must be chosen, and never to continue, which must be consented. Silence at a checkpoint belongs to Invariant 4, never to escalation.

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The document repeatedly claims 'nothing is kept' and 'host retains nothing,' yet the specification explicitly defines persistent structural ledger writes and local community append-only records. This mismatch is dangerous because deployers or users may rely on false privacy guarantees, leading to sensitive operational metadata being retained when they believe the system is trace-free.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.