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Security audit

regenerative-intelligence

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only memory-governance specification with disclosed boundaries and no code that installs, runs, collects, or hides anything.

Installers should treat this as a values-heavy specification, not a working memory system. It is suitable to read or use as a design checklist, but any implementation claiming conformance should still be reviewed for its actual storage, deletion, audit, identity-vault, and user-consent controls.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (7)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Line L098 requires that all person-facing text follow fixed 'language commitments,' which constitutes a natural-language policy constraint. Because the document does not offer a user language/locale choice or clearly justify this as a narrowly scoped regional requirement, it risks forcing a prescribed linguistic style without opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The section describes when the handshake 'may be invoked' using broad natural-language conditions such as 'a human seeks understanding rather than control' and 'a collective wishes to validate or strengthen shared knowledge.' These conditions lack specific trigger phrases, scope boundaries, or negative examples, which could cause unintended or inconsistent invocation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 329)May include surrounding context.

md
### 3. Extractive Knowledge Capture

**Description**  
The risk that collective, cultural, ecological, or experiential knowledge is flattened, summarized, or monetized without consent.

**Failure Modes**
• Over-summarization of collective knowledge

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · threat-model.md (reported line 88)May include surrounding context.

md
### 3. Extractive Knowledge Capture

**Description**  
The risk that collective, cultural, ecological, or experiential knowledge is flattened, summarized, or monetized without consent.

**Failure Modes**
• Over-summarization of collective knowledge

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · threat-model.md (reported line 232)May include surrounding context.

md
### 3. Extractive Knowledge Capture

**Description**  
The risk that collective, cultural, ecological, or experiential knowledge is flattened, summarized, or monetized without consent.

**Failure Modes**
• Over-summarization of collective knowledge

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
76% confidence
Finding

This markdown file defines a failure mode as "any condition where the system begins to act as if it knows more, should act faster, or should retain more than is healthy," but it does not specify concrete boundaries or exclusion conditions for when detection should occur. The wording is broad and subjective, which can make activation or application of these responses unclear across many normal system behaviors.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · invariants.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

md
The system must never store, infer, reconstruct, or reason over the identity of any biological human, animal, community, or traceable group.

This includes (but is not limited to):
- names, handles, or aliases
- locations or geospatial markers
- demographic attributes

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.