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Security audit

IEX Cloud CLI

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent IEX Cloud helper that uses a disclosed API token to call trusted IEX endpoints, with one local token-exposure caveat users should understand.

Install only if you are comfortable giving the skill an IEX Cloud API token for market-data requests. Prefer OpenClaw SecretRefs or IEX_TOKEN over passing --token on the command line, because command-line arguments and the spawned curl invocation can expose the token to local process inspection or shell history.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/iex_cloud_cli.sh:224
Finding
IEX API Token Exposed Through Process Command-Line Arguments## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/iex_cloud_cli.sh:108-111`, `scripts/iex_cloud_cli.sh:224-231` **Vulnerability Type**: API credential disclosure through process arguments **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash --token) [[ $# -ge 2 ]] || die "--token requires a value" TOKEN="$2" shift 2 ;; ``` ```bash curl_args=( --silent --show-error --fail-with-body --max-time "$TIMEOUT" --get "$URL" --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" ) ``` ### Technical Analysis The CLI accepts an API token through the `--token TOKEN` command-line option. This exposes the token in the CLI process's command line and may also preserve it in shell history. Regardless of whether the token originates from the command line or an environment variable, the script then embeds it in a `curl` argument: ```bash --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" ``` Consequently, the spawned `curl` process contains the plaintext credential in its argument vector. Depending on operating-system process visibility and monitoring configuration, the argument may be observable through process inspection interfaces or process-monitoring tools. Although IEX Cloud requires query-parameter authentication, the token does not need to be passed from the script to `curl` as a visible command-line argument. This issue is limited to local credential exposure; the audited code restricts the network destination to the declared IEX API hosts. ### Attack Path 1. A user executes the CLI with a valid IEX token, either through `--token TOKEN` or a supported environment variable. 2. If `--token` is used, the plaintext token appears in the original CLI command line and may be recorded in shell history. 3. The script constructs the `curl_args` array with `token=$TOKEN`. 4. The script launches `curl`, placing the plaintext token in the child process's argument vector. 5. A local user, privileged monitoring service, diagnostic collector, or other process with permission to inspect process ...[truncated 848 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove or deprecate the `--token TOKEN` option because it directly exposes credentials in command history and the CLI process command line. 2. Obtain tokens from an approved secret-management mechanism or a protected input channel. For interactive use, support silent input with `read -r -s`. 3. Avoid placing the token in the spawned `curl` argument vector. Supply sensitive curl configuration through protected standard input or a securely managed file descriptor, such as invoking `curl --config -` and sending the sensitive option through standard input. 4. If a temporary configuration file is unavoidable, create it with permissions restricted to the current user, prevent symbolic-link attacks, and delete it reliably with a shell `trap`. 5. Ensure tokens remain excluded from warnings, error messages, debugging traces, telemetry, and request logs. 6. Document that environment-variable injection through the platform's SecretRef mechanism is preferred, while noting that environment visibility should also be restricted through appropriate operating-system process controls. 7. Add an automated regression test that inspects the spawned `curl` command line and fails if the token appears in its argument vector.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
This code chunk does not implement the declared end-user capability of accessing IEX Cloud market data through REST API calls. Instead, it validates that metadata, docs, and a separate runtime script remain aligned with expected values, including env vars, trusted hosts, and documentation markers. While the checks are related to the IEX Cloud skill ecosystem, the primary behavior of this code is internal validation/QA, not market data retrieval or CLI interaction with the API. Therefore the supplied code chunk materially differs from the declared purpose.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
if credential.get("type") != "env_var":
        fail("primary_credential.type must be env_var")
    if credential.get("env_vars") != EXPECTED_REQUIRED_ENV_VARS:
        fail("primary_credential.env_vars must match required_env_vars")

    provenance = metadata.get("provenance", {})
    for field in ("owner", "repository", "remote"):
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding
The skill advertises shell-based operation and references executable scripts, but the manifest does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That creates an authorization/visibility gap: an agent or reviewer may not realize the skill needs shell and file-read capabilities, increasing the chance of overbroad execution in environments that rely on manifest-declared boundaries.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding
The script sends the authentication token as a query parameter in the curl request, which is a network operation involving credentials. While the script validates hosts and documents the --token option, there is no explicit user-facing warning or disclosure here that the token will be transmitted to the remote API.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.