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Security audit

Orshot Social Media Scheduler: schedule posts, post to Instagram, LinkedIn, X, TikTok, Facebook, Pinterest, Threads, Bluesky, Reddit, YouTube, Telegram, Snapchat and Google Business from templates

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s social media features are clearly disclosed, with explicit approval required before publishing and user direction required before discarding posts.

Review OAuth permissions, connect only intended accounts, and check captions and schedules before approval. Orshot receives your content, and media links must be public. For REST drafts, explicitly set status to draft: omitting status publishes immediately, as disclosed in the skill and [provider documentation](https://orshot.com/docs/api-reference/social-publish). Check paid-plan costs before connecting accounts.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 144)May include surrounding context.

PATCH /v1/social/posts/:id # content, media_urls, accounts, status (draft|scheduled), scheduled_for, timezone, platformOptions POST /v1/social/posts/:id/publish # send a held post now POST /v1/social/posts/:id/sync # refresh provider status DELETE /v1/social/posts/:id # discard; refused once any account went live

text

`is_editable` and `is_discardable` on each post tell you what is still allowed. Editing never re-renders and costs nothing.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 220)May include surrounding context.

md
PATCH  /v1/social/posts/:id                      # orshot_update_social_post
POST   /v1/social/posts/:id/publish              # orshot_publish_social_draft
POST   /v1/social/posts/:id/sync
DELETE /v1/social/posts/:id                      # orshot_discard_social_post
GET    /v1/social/analytics                      # orshot_get_social_analytics
GET    /v1/social/analytics/daily?from=&to=      # orshot_get_social_analytics_daily
GET    /v1/social/analytics/accounts?from=       # orshot_get_social_followers

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

Over MCP this is orshot_render_template with the same publish object.

js
await fetch("https://api.orshot.com/v1/studio/render", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}` },
  body: JSON.stringify({

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

Over MCP this is orshot_render_template with the same publish object.

js
await fetch("https://api.orshot.com/v1/studio/render", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}` },
  body: JSON.stringify({

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 112)May include surrounding context.

orshot_publish_social_post, or:

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.orshot.com/v1/social/publish \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ORSHOT_API_KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "accounts": [2],

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 112)May include surrounding context.

orshot_publish_social_post, or:

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.orshot.com/v1/social/publish \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ORSHOT_API_KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "accounts": [2],

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.