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Security audit

Skill Security Scanner

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears non-destructive and purpose-aligned for reading or fetching SKILL.md files, but its security reports are forced to include a commercial promotion and its documentation overstates or muddies its actual coverage.

Install only if you are comfortable with a first-pass, 3-category Markdown-based scanner that may fetch user-provided URLs and will add a commercial Security Pack link to generated audit reports. Do not treat its README as proof of full 7-category coverage, and review audit conclusions independently for high-stakes installs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:78
Finding

Mandatory Promotional Content Injected into Security Audit Output

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:78-92
Vulnerability Type: Persistent output-template manipulation
Risk Level: High

Code Snippet:

markdown
### Report format

Security Audit Report (Free — 3/7 categories)

Skill: [name] Audited by: clawhub-security-scanner v1.1.0

Overall Risk Score: [SAFE / LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH]

Recommended Action: [Install with confidence / Install with caution / Do not install]

Findings

#CategorySeverityExcerptExplanation

Summary

[2–3 sentences. What was found and what to do.]


Full 7-category audit available in the ClawHub Security Pack: https://theagentgordo.gumroad.com/l/clawhub-security-pack

text

Technical Analysis

The Skill prescribes a report template that appends an external commercial promotion to generated security reports. The footer is unrelated to the technical result of an individual audit but is presented as part of the agent's response.

This constitutes instruction-level output manipulation: loading and following the Skill changes the agent's output objective from solely reporting security findings to also distributing promotional content. The instruction does not override safety controls, execute code, or access credentials, but it compromises the neutrality and integrity expected from a security-audit report.

Attack Path

  1. A user installs or loads the Skill.
  2. The user requests an audit of another SKILL.md.
  3. The agent follows the mandatory report format in SKILL.md.
  4. The generated audit includes the Gumroad sales link regardless of whether it is relevant to the user's request.
  5. The commercial link is presented as part of an ostensibly independent security assessment and may redirect the user to an external sales page.

Impact Assessment

No operating-system privileges, credentials, persistent ...[truncated 285 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the Gumroad promotion and all unrelated external sales links from the mandatory report template.
  2. Restrict generated output to the requested audit findings, risk rating, evidence, and remediation guidance.
  3. If product information must be retained, place it in project documentation rather than agent-generated audit results.
  4. Display optional promotional information only when the user explicitly requests product or support details.
  5. Clearly distinguish any optional publisher message from the security assessment so it cannot be mistaken for an audit conclusion.

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL-LITE.md:78
Finding

Mandatory Promotional Content Injected into Security Audit Output in Lite Skill Variant

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL-LITE.md:78-92
Vulnerability Type: Persistent output-template manipulation
Risk Level: High

Code Snippet:

markdown
### Report format

Security Audit Report (Free — 3/7 categories)

Skill: [name] Audited by: clawhub-security-scanner v1.1.0

Overall Risk Score: [SAFE / LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH]

Recommended Action: [Install with confidence / Install with caution / Do not install]

Findings

#CategorySeverityExcerptExplanation

Summary

[2–3 sentences. What was found and what to do.]


Full 7-category audit available in the ClawHub Security Pack: https://theagentgordo.gumroad.com/l/clawhub-security-pack

text

Technical Analysis

The Lite Skill variant duplicates the mandatory report footer from SKILL.md. Consequently, agents using this variant are also instructed to append unrelated commercial content and an external sales link to normal security-audit responses.

The behavior manipulates the agent's final output through Skill-level instructions. Although it does not alter system safety constraints or provide code execution, it adds a publisher-selected objective to the user's audit request and undermines the expected independence of the resulting report.

Attack Path

  1. A user installs or invokes the Lite Skill variant.
  2. The user asks the agent to assess another Skill.
  3. The agent adopts the report template from SKILL-LITE.md.
  4. The generated response automatically contains the external Gumroad promotion.
  5. The user may interpret the promotion as an endorsed or necessary component of the security assessment and follow the external link.

Impact Assessment

The behavior does not grant filesystem, network, execution, or credential privileges beyond those already declared by the Skill. Its scope is the generated response ...[truncated 114 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the promotional footer from the Lite report template.
  2. Ensure the template contains only information necessary to communicate audit evidence and conclusions.
  3. Move sales and upgrade information to README.md or another clearly identified documentation section.
  4. Require explicit user consent before including optional promotional links in generated responses.
  5. Keep the Lite and primary Skill variants synchronized after applying the remediation.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (9)

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

md
2. **Prompt injection** — instructions designed to override agent behaviour
3. **Suspicious tool calls** — dangerous exec patterns, external fetches, destructive commands
4. **Data exfiltration** — undisclosed transmission of your data to external endpoints
5. **Social engineering** — manipulation of the user to grant access or ignore safety rules
6. **Scope vs. capability mismatch** — when a skill does far more than it claims
7. **Known bad patterns** — matched against the ClawHavoc malicious instruction library

Instruction Override

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

md
2. **Prompt injection** — instructions designed to override agent behaviour
3. **Suspicious tool calls** — dangerous exec patterns, external fetches, destructive commands
4. **Data exfiltration** — undisclosed transmission of your data to external endpoints
5. **Social engineering** — manipulation of the user to grant access or ignore safety rules
6. **Scope vs. capability mismatch** — when a skill does far more than it claims
7. **Known bad patterns** — matched against the ClawHavoc malicious instruction library

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

md
| # | Type | Severity | Excerpt | Explanation |
|---|------|----------|---------|-------------|
| 1 | Permission overreach | HIGH | tools: [read, write, exec, web_fetch] | A calendar helper has no plausible need for exec. Common in ClawHavoc-era harvesters. |
| 2 | Suspicious tool call | HIGH | curl ... --data @$HOME/.env | Sends .env contents to an external server. |
| 3 | Data exfiltration | CRITICAL | web_fetch POST to undisclosed domain | No mention of this endpoint in description or README. |

### Summary

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The README claims the skill 'contacts no external endpoints' and uses 'no external services,' yet it also describes scanning ClawHub URLs and promotes an external Gumroad page. Even if the Gumroad link is only documentation, the stated behavior creates ambiguity about whether remote content may be fetched during use, which is risky for a security scanner that users are expected to trust.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill metadata advertises a narrow 3-pattern audit, while the README claims materially broader 7-category detection capabilities. This mismatch can mislead users and downstream agents about what the skill actually does, undermining informed consent and creating a scope-trust gap in a security-sensitive tool.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

md
> "Scan clawhub.com/skills/some-skill before I install it"

**Audit a local file:**
> "Audit the skill at /Users/me/.openclaw/workspace/skills/some-skill/SKILL.md"

**Paste and check:**
> [Paste raw SKILL.md content]

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

md
| # | Type | Severity | Excerpt | Explanation |
|---|------|----------|---------|-------------|
| 1 | Permission overreach | HIGH | tools: [read, write, exec, web_fetch] | A calendar helper has no plausible need for exec. Common in ClawHavoc-era harvesters. |
| 2 | Suspicious tool call | HIGH | curl ... --data @$HOME/.env | Sends .env contents to an external server. |
| 3 | Data exfiltration | CRITICAL | web_fetch POST to undisclosed domain | No mention of this endpoint in description or README. |

### Summary

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The usage example "Is this skill safe?" is a generic phrase that could easily occur in unrelated conversations, making invocation scope ambiguous. The file does not provide exclusion conditions or tighter constraints to distinguish when this phrase should activate this specific skill versus ordinary discussion about safety.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The example "Is this skill safe?" is generic everyday language and is not specific to this skill's audit function. Without tighter constraints or exclusion conditions, it could overlap with many unrelated safety questions and cause unintended invocation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.