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Security audit

auteng-docs

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill clearly publishes user-provided documentation to AutEng and discloses its public sharing, wallet-authenticated workspace actions, and network destination.

Install this only if you are comfortable sending selected markdown to auteng.ai and making shared documents public. Do not publish secrets, use a limited-purpose wallet for authenticated workspace actions, and consider pinning or reviewing the @auteng/docs package version in controlled environments.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:9
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party npm Dependency## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 9–13 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```yaml metadata: openclaw: requires: bins: [] env: [] config: [] install: - kind: node package: "@auteng/docs" bins: [] ``` A second installation instruction appears at lines 78–85: ```markdown ### Using `@auteng/docs` (TypeScript) ```bash npm install @auteng/docs ``` ```typescript import { publish } from '@auteng/docs'; ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill installs `@auteng/docs` without specifying an exact version, lockfile, or package integrity hash. Consequently, installation resolves the package version selected by the npm registry at installation time rather than a release reviewed together with this skill. Third-party npm packages can contain executable code and lifecycle scripts. If the package publisher, publishing credentials, or distribution channel is compromised, a malicious release could run code during installation or when the imported API is used. The dependency's implementation is not included in the audited project, so its actual runtime behavior and the documentation's claim that it never handles private keys could not be independently verified. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `@auteng/docs` publisher account, release process, or another relevant supply-chain component. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious package version under the same package name. 3. A user installs the skill while the malicious release is selected by npm because no exact version is specified. 4. npm downloads the changed package and may execute malicious lifecycle scripts during installation. 5. Alternatively, malicious behavior runs when the skill imports and invokes the package. 6. The payload acts with the privileges and environmental access of the user or agent process performing the installation or invocation. This is a co ...[truncated 785 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin `@auteng/docs` to a reviewed, exact version rather than relying on the registry's current default release. 2. Commit a lockfile containing the resolved version and integrity metadata where the skill packaging format permits it. 3. Verify package provenance, publisher identity, release signatures, and npm integrity data before installation. 4. Audit the exact dependency release and its transitive dependencies before deployment. 5. Disable npm lifecycle scripts during installation where compatible, for example by using `--ignore-scripts`. 6. Run installation and execution in a sandbox with minimum filesystem, network, environment-variable, and wallet access. 7. Avoid exposing secrets or unrestricted signing capabilities to the dependency process. 8. Consider vendoring the reviewed implementation or using an internally controlled package mirror with an allowlisted digest.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
The workspace tools (`auteng_docs_*`) give you persistence, versioning, and folders. They accept wallet auth as tool parameters: `wallet_address`, `wallet_signature`, `wallet_timestamp`, `wallet_nonce`, `agent_display_name`.

## Quick Start — curl (No Dependencies)

Publish markdown and get a share link in one command:
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.