T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:11- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Allow Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:11-15; also documented inscripts/server.py:10-11
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet:
markdown 2. Python dependencies installed: ```bash pip install pyautogui pygetwindow pillow pyperclip opencv-python ```The same installation instruction is also present in the script documentation:
python Dependencies: pip install pyautogui pygetwindow pillow pyperclip opencv-pythonTechnical Analysis
The installation command specifies package names without exact versions or package hashes. Consequently, installation resolves whichever releases are available from the configured Python package index at that time.
This prevents reproducible dependency resolution and means the code reviewed during this audit may not be the code installed by a future user. If an upstream package account, release pipeline, or configured package index is compromised, a malicious release could execute code during package installation or when imported by
scripts/server.py.The project also imports these dependencies at module initialization, including
pyautogui,pygetwindow,PIL,pyperclip,cv2, andnumpy. A compromised dependency could therefore execute before any Skill function is called.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises a listed package, its maintainer account, release infrastructure, or a package index trusted by the victim.
- The attacker publishes a malicious version under one of the dependency names.
- A user follows the documented unpinned
pip installcommand. - The package manager resolves and installs the malicious release because no approved version or hash is enforced.
- Malicious code executes during installation or when
scripts/server.pyimports the dependency.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation would run code with the pr ...[truncated 474 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every direct dependency to a reviewed exact version, for example with
package==version. - Generate a lockfile containing all transitive dependency versions.
- Require package hashes during installation, such as through a hash-locked requirements file and
pip install --require-hashes. - Install packages only from an explicitly configured, trusted package index.
- Add automated dependency vulnerability and provenance scanning to the release process.
- Periodically update dependencies through a controlled review process rather than resolving mutable latest versions during installation.
- Move installation requirements into a version-controlled dependency manifest instead of relying solely on documentation commands.
- Pin every direct dependency to a reviewed exact version, for example with
