T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:13- Finding
Unpinned External Source Installation Enables Supply-Chain Code Execution
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 13–18
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and insufficiently verified third-party source dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash git clone https://github.com/NVlabs/Eagle eagle && cd eagle/Embodied pip install -e . # Optional MagiAttention (Hopper/Blackwell only, long sequences 32K+): # git clone https://github.com/SandAI-org/MagiAttention.git && cd MagiAttention && git checkout v1.0.5 # git submodule update --init --recursive && pip install --no-build-isolation .Technical Analysis
The installation procedure clones the Eagle repository from its mutable default branch and immediately installs it with
pip install -e .. No immutable commit, cryptographic checksum, signature, or dependency lock is specified. Python package installation can execute source-controlled build backend and packaging logic, so the reviewed Skill does not uniquely determine the code that will execute when a user follows these instructions.The optional MagiAttention procedure checks out a named tag rather than a reviewed commit hash. Tags can be moved unless independently verified. It also initializes recursive submodules and performs an installation with build isolation disabled. Submodules expand the set of external sources that must be trusted, while
--no-build-isolationallows the build to interact with packages already present in the active environment.No evidence establishes that the named upstream projects are currently malicious. The vulnerability is the unsafe trust and installation model, which permits the effective payload to change after this Skill has been reviewed.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises an upstream repository, maintainer account, mutable tag, submodule, or transitive package source.
- The attacker inserts malicious behavior into package initialization, the selected build backend, instal ...[truncated 1194 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin Eagle and MagiAttention to reviewed, immutable full commit hashes rather than a default branch or tag.
- Record and verify cryptographic checksums or trusted signatures for downloaded source archives.
- Pin recursive submodules to reviewed commits and verify that
.gitmodulespoints only to approved repositories. - Lock all Python dependencies to exact versions and require hashes, such as through a generated lock file and
pip install --require-hashes. - Avoid
--no-build-isolationunless operationally necessary. If required, use a clean environment containing only explicitly pinned build dependencies. - Review package build metadata and installation scripts before installation.
- Perform installation in an isolated, non-privileged container or virtual machine without mounted credentials or sensitive datasets.
- Restrict outbound network access during build and installation where feasible.
- Document the exact reviewed revisions and provide a reproducible installation procedure.
