Idea Validator

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 6:19 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill is a local startup-idea report generator with a minor dependency hygiene issue, but no evidence of hidden access, persistence, exfiltration, or destructive behavior.

Install in an isolated environment and avoid the optional `requests` dependency unless future web-research functionality actually requires it; treat generated market data as generic guidance, not verified research.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:76

Finding

Unpinned and Unnecessary Third-Party Dependency Installation

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 76
Vulnerability Type: Uncontrolled third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

bash

- Install dependencies before first use: `pip install requests`

Technical Analysis

The setup documentation directs users to install requests without specifying a version, verifying an integrity hash, using a lock file, or requiring a trusted package index. Consequently, the installed artifact depends on the package version and index selected at installation time rather than a dependency reviewed with this project.

Although requests is imported optionally in scripts/idea_validator.py, the code paths associated with the --web option are not implemented and execute only pass. The dependency is therefore unnecessary for the application's current behavior, while its installation still introduces package-index and transitive-dependency supply-chain exposure.

Exploitation would require the selected package source or resolved artifact to be compromised, substituted, or otherwise attacker-controlled. The project itself does not contain evidence that the legitimate requests package is malicious.

Attack Path

1. A user follows the installation instruction in SKILL.md.
2. pip resolves requests and its transitive dependencies through the user's configured package index.
3. An attacker has compromised a resolved release, dependency, mirror, or configured index, causing a malicious artifact to be selected.
4. The malicious package installation logic or imported package code executes under the account running pip or the application.
5. Attacker-controlled code gains access to the files, credentials, environment variables, and network resources available to that account.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user performing the install ...[truncated 395 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Remove the pip install requests instruction and optional import until web research functionality is implemented.
2. If the dependency becomes necessary, pin it to a reviewed version in a dependency manifest rather than installing an unconstrained latest release.
3. Generate and commit a lock file containing exact versions for all transitive dependencies.
4. Require package hashes during installation, such as with a hash-locked requirements file and pip install --require-hashes.
5. Install only from an explicitly trusted package index and prevent unintended fallback to untrusted mirrors.
6. Use an isolated virtual environment and avoid running package installation with administrator or root privileges.
7. Add automated dependency vulnerability and provenance checks to the release process.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (1)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 86% confidence

Finding

The skill advertises executable commands and explicitly instructs installation of the requests dependency, which strongly suggests network-capable code, yet it declares no permissions or allowed-tools scope. That creates an authorization gap where the skill's runtime behavior may exceed what reviewers or orchestrators expect, increasing the risk of ungoverned outbound requests, data exfiltration, or supply-chain exposure through fetched data and dependencies.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.