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Security audit

J

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a simple join/merge reference skill, with the main caution that its one-letter name and broad examples could cause accidental use if invoked loosely.

Install only if you want a short command-reference skill for merge/join tasks. Be deliberate when invoking it, and review wildcard patterns plus output filenames before running examples that redirect with `>` because they can overwrite existing files.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Using a single-letter trigger like j is dangerously overbroad because it can collide with ordinary user text, shell fragments, filenames, or unrelated commands. That increases the chance the agent invokes this skill in the wrong context and performs file-merge operations unexpectedly, which can overwrite outputs, combine sensitive data, or steer workflows away from the user's actual intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The heading and primary explanatory text are written in Chinese, which can impose a language choice on users if the skill is expected to be generally usable. There is no statement that the skill is intentionally region-specific or that users may choose another language.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The invocation guidance includes broad everyday phrases such as 'combine strings' and 'concatenate files' without boundaries, making unintended activation more likely. In an agent setting, ambiguous routing can cause the skill to handle requests outside its safe scope, potentially merging the wrong inputs or encouraging unsafe shell usage on unintended files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The comment at L175 says the command merges Markdown files into a PDF, but the command at L176 outputs to combined.md, which is a Markdown file rather than a PDF. This is a direct contradiction between the inline documentation and the demonstrated behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.