Security audit

@openclaw/imessage

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent iMessage/SMS integration, but it grants OpenClaw access to read, watch, and send Messages data on a configured Mac.

Install only on a Mac and Messages account you control. Keep DM pairing or allowlists enabled, avoid broad group access unless intended, and treat history/search/watch results and attachments as sensitive personal communications.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 86% confidence
Finding: The skill explicitly enables reading, searching, and watching local Messages history and notes Full Disk Access requirements, but it does not clearly foreground the privacy sensitivity of message content, attachments, and metadata or instruct the agent to obtain explicit user consent before surveillance-like actions. In this context, omission matters because the skill supports persistent monitoring (`watch`) and broad local history access, which can expose highly sensitive personal communications if invoked too casually.

VirusTotal

32/32 vendors flagged this plugin as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.env_credential_access

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical

Code: suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location: dist/sanitize-outbound-DKRlFQoD.js:401
Evidence: const child = spawn(this.cliPath, args, { stdio: [

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: dist/monitor-CSTZ-GFU.js:3073
Evidence: const storeAllowFrom = await readChannelAllowFromStore("imessage", process.env, accountInfo.accountId).catch(() => []);