Security audit

FaceTime

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This FaceTime integration has clear caller and approval controls, but requires sensitive Mac setup and sends call audio to your configured voice provider.

Use a dedicated Mac and list only handles you trust with owner access. Consider safe-read-only or none for realtime.toolPolicy. Obtain participants' consent to provider audio processing and keep calls one-to-one, as described in the [setup guide](https://docs.openclaw.ai/plugins/facetime). Understand the SIP debugging change before enabling it, and restore security settings separately when removing the integration. The scanner covered only two skill files; this review additionally examined the plugin runtime, compiled code, and installation scripts, but not the separately distributed native binaries or live call behavior.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical

Code: suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location: dist/runtime-api.js:1216
Evidence: return spawn(command, args, {

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical

Code: suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location: src/audio-pump.ts:173
Evidence: return spawn(command, args, { env, stdio });

Endor dependency reachability

Checked Nov 3, 2026 · 4:48 AM UTC

No reachable vulnerabilities reported

Endor dependency scan completed.