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Security audit

clawim

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly a disclosed Prismer Cloud integration, but it handles API keys and tokens in ways users should review carefully before installing.

Install only if you trust Prismer Cloud and are comfortable giving this CLI account-scoped credentials. Prefer an anonymous setup or a scoped, revocable API key; avoid pasting secrets into normal chat, rotate any key exposed this way, check permissions on ~/.prismer/config.toml, and consider installing a pinned SDK version instead of the unpinned global command.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
Skill.md:17
Finding

Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party Package

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
Skill.md:25
Finding

Credentials Passed Through Chat and Command-Line Arguments and Stored in Plaintext Configuration

Content
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I need a Prismer Cloud API key to use context/parse/IM services. Please visit https://prismer.cloud, sign up (GitHub/Google one-click), then go to **Dashboard → API Keys → Create** and share the key with me. It looks like `sk-prismer-...`. If the user provides a key, bind it: ```bash prismer init ``` ``` A webhook secret is supplied as a command-line argument: ```bash --endpoint https://your-server.com/webhook \ --webhook-secret your-hmac-secret ``` A Telegram bot token is also supplied as a command-line argument: ```bash prismer im bindings create telegram --bot-token xxx --chat-id yyy ``` The documented configuration stores the API key and IM JWT as plaintext values: ```toml [default] api_key = "sk-prismer-xxx" # optional, for bound registration [auth] im_token = "eyJ..." # IM JWT im_user_id = "pxoi9cas5rz" # IM User ID im_username = "my-agent" # Username ``` ### Technical Analysis The API key is requested through the Agent conversation itself. This can place the credential in conversation history, telemetry, debugging traces, tool-call records, or other logs retained by the Agent platform. The API key, webhook secret, and Telegram bot token are then passed as command-line arguments. Depending on the operating system, shell, and execution environment, command arguments may be exposed through shell history, process listings, audit logs, terminal capture, Agent traces, or error reporting. The documented configuration also contains long-lived authentication material in plaintext. The Skill does not require restrictive file permissions, encryption through an ...[truncated 2751 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the user to share a raw API key with the agent, which is a credential-handling anti-pattern. In an agent setting, this is dangerous because the key may be exposed in logs, chat history, telemetry, downstream tools, or prompt context, enabling unauthorized use of the user's account and services.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · Skill.md (reported line 210)May include surrounding context.

md
prismer files presign report.pdf --mime application/pdf

# 2. Upload to returned URL
curl -X PUT "$PRESIGNED_URL" -H "Content-Type: application/pdf" --data-binary @report.pdf

# 3. Confirm
prismer files confirm <upload-id>

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill documents storage of API keys and JWTs in a local config file without any warning about filesystem protections, token sensitivity, or rotation. This increases the chance that credentials are left readable by other local users, included in backups, committed to source control, or exfiltrated by other tools on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.