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Security audit

WebinarJam

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent WebinarJam integration, but its setup instructions include direct execution of remote installer scripts that should be reviewed before use.

Review the oo CLI installation path before installing. Prefer official signed or checksum-verified installers, avoid blindly running curl | bash or irm | iex, and confirm any register_user payload before allowing the skill to change WebinarJam data.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:58
Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Scripts Are Executed Directly## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 58–62 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis The first-time setup instructions download mutable scripts from `cli.oomol.com` and immediately execute them through Bash or PowerShell. Neither command pins an audited release nor verifies a cryptographic checksum or publisher signature before execution. HTTPS protects the connection in transit but does not establish that the retrieved script is the same code that was reviewed. The effective payload may change at any time. Compromise of the hosting service, publishing account, DNS/PKI path, or installer infrastructure could therefore turn these documented commands into an arbitrary code-execution channel. Installing the required CLI is related to the Skill's functionality, but piping an unverified response directly into a shell exceeds the minimum privilege and trust necessary to perform that installation. The artifact can instead be downloaded, inspected, authenticated, and installed with explicit approval. ### Attack Path 1. The `oo` command is unavailable, causing the agent or user to consult the first-time setup instructions. 2. An attacker compromises or gains control over the remote installer response or its delivery infrastructure. 3. The agent or user executes the documented `curl | bash` or `irm | iex` command. 4. The shell executes the attacker-controlled response immediately, without integrity or authenticity verification. 5. The payload performs arbitrary operations under the permissions of the account that launched the command. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation provides arbitrary command execution with the invoking user's privileges. Dependin ...[truncated 546 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove direct `curl | bash` and `irm | iex` execution from the setup instructions. 2. Pin installation instructions to a specific, audited CLI version rather than a mutable generic installer URL. 3. Download the installation artifact to a local file before executing it. 4. Publish a cryptographic checksum through a separately protected release channel and verify it locally before installation. 5. Prefer signed packages or binaries and validate the publisher signature against a documented trusted key. 6. Display the verified installation command and request explicit user approval before execution. 7. Use the operating system's trusted package manager where an official, version-pinned package is available. 8. Run installation with ordinary user privileges unless a specific installation step demonstrably requires elevation; isolate any elevated operation and clearly explain its effect. 9. For PowerShell, invoke a downloaded and verified script file directly rather than evaluating a network response with `Invoke-Expression`.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
- **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>):

  ```bash
  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  ```

  ```powershell
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to install software by piping a remotely fetched script directly into a shell (`curl ... | bash`). This is dangerous because any compromise of the remote host, transport chain, or install script would result in immediate arbitrary code execution on the user's machine, and the skill context makes it worse by presenting the command as an operational recovery step.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The description says to use this skill for "ANY WebinarJam request" and "Whenever a task involves WebinarJam," which is a very broad activation condition. It does not provide narrower trigger phrases, scope constraints, or negative examples, so it could cause unintended invocation for loosely related mentions of WebinarJam.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.