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Security audit

Walletap

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

Walletap changes require approval, but setup can execute unverified remote installers and introduce broader changes to your agent environment.

Review setup before installing. Install an independently verified CLI version yourself and decide whether to allow its automatic agent-skill synchronization; the [command reference](https://github.com/oomol-lab/oo-cli/blob/main/docs/commands.md) documents a disable option. Walletap changes have explicit approval safeguards, but installer contents and remote service behavior were not audited. No malicious behavior was established.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The supplied code installs software from an Oomol endpoint rather than performing Walletap data operations. Nothing in the chunk establishes that this installer is a supporting dependency for Walletap. The downloaded script's contents and further effects are not available for assessment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Piping the HTTPS installer directly into bash executes whatever the endpoint returns without verifying a pinned artifact or allowing inspection before execution. HTTPS protects transport but does not protect against compromise of the publisher or hosting infrastructure, potentially exposing local files and credentials; this is the same underlying installer risk as SQP-2.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

The setup workflow executes remotely downloaded installation scripts without warning about the system-integrity risk.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The setup instructions execute remote shell or PowerShell content immediately, without an integrity check or explicit approval for installing software. A compromised installer endpoint or distribution pipeline could execute arbitrary code with the agent's local privileges; limiting installation to a missing-CLI error reduces exposure but does not remove that risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 83)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources