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Security audit

Uploadcare

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The Uploadcare workflow has clear safeguards, but setup directs the agent to execute an unverified remote installer without explicit approval.

Review and approve CLI installation separately, including its bundled-skill synchronization. Prefer a reviewed, version-pinned installation with integrity verification. Remote installer contents remain unverified. Connecting Uploadcare grants OOMOL access through your account; retain the skill's confirmation requirements for storing and deleting files.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The supplied code installs software from Oomol rather than performing Uploadcare operations. Nothing in the chunk establishes this installation as a supporting dependency for Uploadcare. The downloaded script's contents and downstream effects are not provided, so those effects cannot be determined.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Piping an HTTPS response directly into bash executes mutable remote content with the invoking user's permissions, without a pinned version or independent integrity check. Compromise of the installer endpoint or its delivery infrastructure could expose local files and credentials or permit persistent changes; the analogous PowerShell command has the same risk. The legitimate dependency-setup context reduces suspicion of malicious intent but does not remove this supply-chain exposure.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

The setup workflow executes remote installation scripts without warning about local system changes or remote-code execution.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The fallback directs the agent to execute downloaded shell or PowerShell code without explaining that this runs third-party code locally or requiring approval for installation. Although setup is conditional, a request to operate Uploadcare could consequently trigger local system changes beyond the requested service operation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 82)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources