T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:60- Finding
Unverified Remote Installation Scripts Executed Directly by Shells
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 60–68
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: CriticalVulnerable Code
markdown - **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>): ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ```Technical Analysis
The installation instructions retrieve mutable scripts from external URLs and immediately pass their contents to Bash or PowerShell. Neither command pins a release version, verifies a checksum, validates a cryptographic signature, nor gives the user an opportunity to inspect the downloaded script before execution.
HTTPS protects the connection in transit under normal conditions, but it does not establish that the script currently hosted at the URL is the same code that was reviewed. Compromise of the hosting account, web server, CDN, DNS infrastructure, TLS credentials, or release process could cause arbitrary attacker-controlled code to be returned and executed.
Installing the CLI is only a first-time fallback when
oois unavailable and is not necessary during normal Skill execution. The declared runtime capability is narrowly limited toBash(oo *), but these installation instructions establish a separate, unauditable bootstrap path with unrestricted shell execution. The remote installer contents were not included in the audited project, so their behavior and privilege requirements could not be verified.The Skill also intentionally sends action names and user-provided JSON to the OOMOL Tomba connector. Such data can include email addresses, names, domains, or LinkedIn URLs. This network transmission is disclosed and is functionally necessary for the declared remote lookup service; the reviewed file pro ...[truncated 1894 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove both direct pipe-to-shell installation commands from the Skill instructions.
- Prefer an authenticated operating-system package manager or an official, versioned release package with a reviewable installation process.
- Pin the CLI to an explicit version rather than retrieving a mutable
install.shorinstall.ps1endpoint. - Publish SHA-256 checksums through an independently authenticated release channel and require users to verify the downloaded artifact before execution.
- Cryptographically sign release artifacts and document signature verification using a pinned publisher key or platform-native code-signing mechanism.
- Use a download-verify-execute workflow so the installer is saved locally and can be inspected before it is run.
- Document the exact files, directories, network endpoints, and permissions required by the installer. Do not request administrator privileges unless a clearly identified installation mode strictly requires them.
- Keep CLI installation outside automated Skill execution. If
oois missing, report the condition and direct the user to verified installation documentation rather than executing installation commands. - For stronger supply-chain assurance, distribute reproducible build instructions and provenance attestations so users can confirm that release artifacts correspond to reviewed source code.
