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Security audit

TimeCamp

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The TimeCamp skill is mostly coherent, but its setup tells users to run an unverified internet installer directly in a shell, so it needs review before installation.

Install only if you are comfortable with OOMOL mediating TimeCamp actions and with the documented setup risk. Prefer the official install guide or a signed/package-manager install path, inspect and verify any downloaded installer before running it, avoid elevated shells, and confirm all TimeCamp write actions before execution.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:63
Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Download and Immediate Shell Execution## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 63-67 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: Critical ### Vulnerable Code ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis The setup instructions pipe mutable content retrieved from an external server directly into Bash or PowerShell. The downloaded installers are not pinned to a specific version, saved for inspection, or validated using a publisher signature or cryptographic checksum before execution. Although the download domain is associated with the service used by the Skill, this pattern makes the effective executable payload dependent on whatever the server returns at invocation time. The reviewed Skill therefore cannot guarantee that the executed code is the same code that existed when the Skill was audited. Installing the required CLI may support the declared TimeCamp integration, but immediate execution of an unverified response exceeds the minimum-risk installation process. Compromise of the hosting infrastructure, DNS, TLS termination, installer publication pipeline, or privileged publisher account could turn these instructions into an arbitrary-code delivery channel. ### Attack Path 1. The `oo` CLI is unavailable, causing the Agent or user to follow the first-time setup instructions. 2. An attacker compromises the installer host, publication pipeline, DNS resolution, TLS delivery infrastructure, or another component capable of controlling the HTTP response. 3. The attacker replaces or modifies `install.sh` or `install.ps1` with a malicious payload. 4. `curl | bash` or `irm | iex` forwards the response directly to a command interpreter without verification. 5. The malicious payload executes with the privileges of the Agent or user running the installation c ...[truncated 969 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the direct `curl | bash` and `irm | iex` installation instructions. 2. Prefer a trusted platform package manager that validates publisher signatures and package integrity. 3. If a standalone installer is required, pin it to an immutable, explicitly identified release rather than a mutable generic installation URL. 4. Download the installer to a local file without executing it. 5. Publish an expected SHA-256 digest through an independently protected release channel and verify it before execution. 6. Cryptographically sign release artifacts and validate the signature against a pinned, documented publisher key. 7. Allow the user to inspect the downloaded installer and request explicit approval before running it. 8. Execute installation with standard user privileges unless a specific, documented operation strictly requires elevation. 9. Document the exact files, directories, network endpoints, and configuration changes made by the installer. 10. Fail closed if checksum, signature, version, or origin validation fails; do not fall back to executing an unverified response.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
- **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>):

  ```bash
  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  ```

  ```powershell
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to install software by piping a remotely fetched script directly into a shell (`curl ... | bash`). This is dangerous because it executes unverified code from the network with the user's privileges, creating a supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk if the host, transport, or script distribution path is compromised.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The description says to use this skill for "ANY TimeCamp request" and "Whenever a task involves TimeCamp," which is a very broad activation condition with no exclusions or negative examples. In a manifest/markdown context, this can overlap with casual mentions of TimeCamp and may cause unintended invocation instead of more specific routing.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.