T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:66- Finding
Unverified Remote Installation Scripts Executed Directly by a Shell
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 66–75
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: CriticalVulnerable Code
bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linuxpowershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShellTechnical Analysis
The first-time setup instructions download mutable scripts from external URLs and pass them directly to command interpreters. Neither command pins an immutable release, verifies a cryptographic signature or checksum, nor gives the user an opportunity to inspect the downloaded code before execution.
HTTPS protects the connection in transit and authenticates the server at request time, but it does not establish that the returned installer is immutable or benign. A compromise of the publisher, hosting account, release process, DNS or TLS infrastructure—or a malicious upstream modification—could change the effective payload after this Skill has been reviewed.
Installing the CLI is not required for the ordinary declared operation when the prerequisite is already present. Even during initial setup, immediate execution of an unverified remote script exceeds the minimum privilege necessary because safer installation and integrity-verification mechanisms are available.
The audit found no evidence that these scripts are currently malicious. The vulnerability is the creation of an unverified remote code-execution channel.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the installer endpoint, publishing process, hosting account, or relevant network trust infrastructure.
- The attacker modifies
install.shorinstall.ps1to include arbitrary commands. - The
oocommand is unavailable, causing the documented first-time setup path to be used. - The user or Agent executes the applicable installation command.
- The remote response is sent immediately to Bas ...[truncated 928 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
-
Remove all
curl | bashandirm | iexinstallation instructions. -
Pin installation to a specific, immutable CLI release rather than a mutable installer URL.
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Download the artifact to a local file without executing it automatically.
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Publish and verify a cryptographic signature from a trusted release key. If signatures are unavailable, verify a SHA-256 digest obtained through a separately trusted channel.
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Prefer a reputable package manager that provides version pinning, integrity metadata, and auditable package contents.
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Present the source, expected filesystem changes, and requested permissions before execution.
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Require explicit user approval before installing software; do not allow an Agent to initiate installation merely because an action failed.
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Run installation with the least-privileged account possible and avoid elevation unless a documented component strictly requires it.
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Document the trusted upstream repository and provide reproducible or otherwise independently verifiable release artifacts.
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If a script remains necessary, use a safer staged workflow such as:
bash curl -fLo install.sh https://example.invalid/releases/pinned-version/install.sh echo "<pinned-sha256> install.sh" | sha256sum --check - less install.sh bash install.shThe actual URL and digest must correspond to a pinned, trusted release, and execution must occur only after successful verification and user approval.
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