T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Error
- Location
- SKILL.md:58
- Finding
- Unverified Remote Installer Download and Execution## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 58–62 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis The first-time setup instructions download mutable scripts from `cli.oomol.com` and immediately execute them through Bash or PowerShell. The content is not pinned to a version and is not validated using a checksum or cryptographic signature before execution. The user or Agent therefore cannot verify that the executed payload is the same payload that was reviewed. Installing the `oo` CLI supports the Skill's declared Telnyx connector functionality, and the download domain is consistent with the stated OOMOL provider. Nevertheless, direct network-to-interpreter execution is not the minimum safe installation method. Compromise of the download domain, hosting infrastructure, release pipeline, DNS resolution, or applicable TLS trust chain could convert these documented commands into an arbitrary-code-execution mechanism. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the installer hosting service, publication pipeline, domain, or another relevant delivery dependency. 2. The attacker replaces `install.sh` or `install.ps1` with a malicious payload. 3. The `oo` command is unavailable and the user or Agent follows the documented first-time setup instructions. 4. `curl` or `Invoke-RestMethod` retrieves the attacker-controlled content. 5. The shell pipe passes that content directly to Bash or `Invoke-Expression`, without integrity validation or prior inspection. 6. The malicious script executes with the permissions of the invoking account. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation provides arbitrary code execution under the invoking user's privileges. The r ...[truncated 609 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace pipe-to-shell installation with a version-pinned package from an authenticated package manager or an immutable official release artifact. 2. Require users to download the artifact separately rather than passing network output directly to an interpreter. 3. Publish SHA-256 or stronger checksums through an independently authenticated channel and verify them before execution. 4. Cryptographically sign release artifacts and require signature verification against a documented, trusted public key. 5. Pin the installer and CLI to a reviewed version instead of retrieving mutable scripts from an unversioned URL. 6. Allow users to inspect the verified installer before running it. 7. Document that installation should occur without administrative privileges unless a specific, justified component requires elevation. 8. If scripts remain necessary, use fail-closed verification and abort installation whenever checksum or signature validation fails.