T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:77- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Retrieval and Immediate Shell Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 77–81
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code:
bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linuxpowershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShellTechnical Analysis
The first-time setup instructions download mutable scripts from an external server and pass their contents directly to a command interpreter. The Unix command pipes the response into
bash, while the Windows command usesInvoke-Expressionthrough theiexalias.Neither instruction pins an installer version, verifies a cryptographic checksum or signature, nor allows inspection before execution. Consequently, the code that ultimately executes can differ from the content reviewed during this audit. Although the download host is presented as the Skill vendor's domain and installation is only suggested when the CLI is unavailable, those facts do not provide payload integrity.
Installing the CLI is relevant to the declared functionality, but immediate execution of an unverified remote response is not the minimum privilege or safest mechanism necessary to install it. This creates an avoidable supply-chain code-execution channel.
Attack Path
- The
ooCLI is absent, causing an Agent or user to follow the first-time setup instructions. - An attacker compromises the installer host, publication pipeline, DNS resolution, TLS trust chain, or another component capable of controlling the returned response.
- The installer endpoint returns an attacker-controlled shell or PowerShell payload.
bashoriexexecutes the response immediately, without integrity verification or review.- The payload performs arbitrary actions using the permissions of the Agent or user who launched the command.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation provides ...[truncated 800 chars]
- The
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove both direct download-to-interpreter patterns.
- Prefer a trusted platform package manager or a version-pinned release artifact from the vendor's authenticated release repository.
- Separate download and execution into distinct steps so the artifact can be inspected before use.
- Publish SHA-256 or stronger checksums through an independently protected channel and require verification before execution.
- Prefer cryptographic release signatures and verify them against a pinned, documented signing key.
- Pin the installer or package to an explicit version rather than using a mutable generic installer URL.
- Execute installation with ordinary user privileges unless a specific installation step demonstrably requires elevation.
- Document the files, network destinations, and permissions required by the installer.
- If automated installation remains necessary, fail closed when signature or checksum verification fails.
A safer workflow is: download a versioned artifact, verify its signature and expected digest, inspect or unpack it, and only then execute the verified installer as a separate command.
