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Security audit

Store Leads

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is mostly a normal Store Leads connector skill, but its setup fallback tells users to execute an unverified internet installer directly in a shell.

Install only if you trust OOMOL's CLI distribution path. Prefer installing the oo CLI through a verified or pinned release path before using the skill, and avoid running the provided shell or PowerShell installer commands from an elevated terminal.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:56
Finding
Unverified Remote Installation Scripts Executed Directly by Shell Interpreters<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 56-65 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown - **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>): ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions retrieve mutable scripts from `cli.oomol.com` and immediately execute them using Bash or PowerShell. Neither command pins an immutable script version nor verifies a cryptographic signature or checksum before execution. The effective code therefore may change after the Skill has been audited. Installing the required CLI when it is unavailable is related to the declared functionality. However, piping an unverified network response directly into a shell exceeds the minimum privileges and trust necessary to perform that installation. The same risk exists in both platform-specific commands: `curl | bash` on macOS/Linux and `irm | iex` on Windows. The audit found no evidence that the current remote scripts are malicious. Nevertheless, their contents are outside the reviewed project and cannot be statically verified. Compromise of the download host, DNS, TLS termination, publishing credentials, or installation infrastructure could convert these commands into an arbitrary-code execution mechanism. ### Attack Path 1. A user attempts to invoke the Skill on a system where the `oo` command is unavailable. 2. The command fails with an `oo: command not found` error. 3. The Skill's fallback instructions direct the user or Agent to run the platform-specific installation command. 4. The command retrieves the current script from `https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh` or `https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1`. 5. Bash or PowerShell execu ...[truncated 1042 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace direct `curl | bash` and `irm | iex` execution with installation through a trusted platform package manager or a pinned release artifact. 2. Pin the CLI to a specific, reviewed version rather than retrieving a mutable default installer. 3. Download the installer to a local file without executing it immediately. 4. Publish and verify a cryptographic checksum or signature using a trust channel separate from the artifact download. 5. Abort installation if verification fails; do not allow an unverified fallback. 6. Present the verified script or package details to the user and require explicit approval before executing installation code. 7. Document the installer's expected filesystem changes, network destinations, privilege requirements, and whether administrative elevation is required. 8. Avoid running the installer as root or administrator unless a specific installation step demonstrably requires that privilege. A safer workflow is: ```bash curl -fL --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 \ -o oo-install.sh \ 'https://cli.oomol.com/releases/<PINNED_VERSION>/install.sh' echo '<PUBLISHED_SHA256> oo-install.sh' | sha256sum --check - bash oo-install.sh ``` The corresponding PowerShell workflow should download a pinned artifact, validate its publisher signature or SHA-256 digest, stop on verification failure, and execute it only after explicit approval. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
- **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>):

  ```bash
  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  ```

  ```powershell
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to install software by piping a remotely fetched script directly into `bash`, which executes unverified code from the network without integrity checking. If the install host, transport, or script content is compromised, this can lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's machine.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The description says to use this skill for "ANY Store Leads request" and whenever a task involves Store Leads. That activation scope is very broad and does not provide constraints or exclusion examples, increasing the risk of unintended invocation for loosely related requests.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.